Emerging Complexities and Ambiguities of Chinese Aid: 
The Case of Southern Africa

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the content of various forms of Chinese involvement in selected Southern African countries (Zimbabwe and Botswana) and their impact on development, peace and security. Evidence is gathered through a triangulation of qualitative data collection and analytical techniques that include content analysis of purposely selected media reports, policy documents and publications. The findings show that China is progressively becoming one of the Africa’s most important economic and political partners through the provision of development loans, technical aid transfers and private investment across all the sectors particularly natural resources. The motives for Chinese involvement in Africa have never come in fixed and stable proportions. The main forces behind China’s involvement are both economic and political. The central argument of this paper is that China’s increasing presence in Southern Africa which is greatly influenced by its policy of ‘non-interference’ has had double-edged effects for regional integration, peace and security. The China-Africa nexus has inevitably become both an asset and liability for peace and security. Using Michel Foucault’s Power and Dominance framework, the article argues that China uses its ‘soft’ power as a ‘global governmentality’ strategy to exert its geo-political influence both regionally and internationally.

Keywords: Non-interference, soft power, hegemony, aid, global governmentality.

INTRODUCTION

The African continent has struggled with chronic poverty and under-development since the advent of political independence more than fifty years ago despite witnessing unprecedented growth in aid in-flows to the region particularly south of the Sahara. While international aid has structurally influenced the management of national economies, it is has also been blamed for the continued and seemingly intractable development crisis confronting the continent (Carlsson, Somolokae & van de Walle, 1997). International aid through governmental and non–governmental development agencies has been provided ostensibly to enhance real economic development through investment in both infrastructural and social services. The idea of foreign aid was compatible with the central theme of economic development, and was accepted as a possible escape from the chronic underdevelopment that is characterized by undeveloped infrastructure and dualistic economies, if that aid was effectively managed (Easterly 2003; Brautigam & Knack, 2004) The persistence of the deplorable economic conditions in Africa has become the primary reason for the relentless search for realistic and durable solutions to the continent's development woes, even as the need for aid is intermittently reinforced by the fact that Africa's underdevelopment is
accentuated by periodic global economic recession. The main objective of aid is to produce accelerated economic growth, combined with higher standards of consumption, but as we have seen, aid is very much influenced by prevailing regional or global political climates. This article seeks to examine the content of China’s aid to Zimbabwe and Botswana, and how its policy of ‘soft power’ and non-interference has created potential complexities and ambiguities for development, peace and security.

China’s foreign aid to Africa has a long history dating back to Africa’s fight against colonialism and imperialism. From 1956 to 1977, China, despite its own great economic plight, offered economic aid amounting to $2.476 billion to Africa countries, which accounted for 58% of China’s total foreign aid (Jianbo & Zhang 2009). By May 2006, it had contributed a total of 44.4 billion yuan (US$5.7 billion) for more than 800 aid projects (Wang, 2007:8). Foreign aid has been found to do more harm than good, leading to the situation where Africans have failed to set their own pace and direction of development; free of external interference. Both Botswana and Zimbabwe became donor driven economies following their attainment of political independence. The traditional donors over the years have been western governments and non-governmental organizations with the Bretton Woods Institutions (WB and IMF) as the underwriters of either aid or grants. Conditions for accessing the support included good economic and political governance particularly democratic transformations in former socialist driven economies. Unlike its northern neighbor, the Botswana escaped the ‘African’ vicious cycle of economic decline, loss of state capacity and political instability and continued to receive aid even after its ‘graduation’ to a middle-income status (Maipose, Somolokae and Johnston, 1997). The most important donors were the European community, World Bank and UN Agencies. However, recently most African countries particularly those uncomfortable with such conditions like Zimbabwe have taken a ‘Look East Policy’ posture striking new ‘deals’ with Asian partners particularly China.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This article uses Michel Foucault’s (1977; 1980) Power and Dominance framework to examine the nature and extent of Chinese aid to Africa using the experiences of Zimbabwe and Botswana. According to the framework there are three main different forms of power; sovereignty, government and discipline. These are expressed in various and often overlapping ways at all levels; national, international and globally. According to Foucault power relations...are...about domination, about an infinitely dense and multiple domination that never comes to an end (Kelly 2009: 64). Political power is exercised globally through a profusion of shifting strategies and apparatuses with a view to maintain influence or domination. As Dillon (1995) observed, states themselves are both the product of mobile and plural mechanisms of calculation for the production of political subjectivity as well as collections of devices by which subjectivity can be produced and graduated to other states. According to Foucault (1977: 26; 1980: 142) the features of power include; it is subjectless or impersonal, it is relational and multidirectional; and it is strategic and intentional in nature.

It is his concept of ‘global governmentality’ or ‘global politics’ or ‘biopolitics’ (Foucault 2000) that we find quite insightful when applied to China-Africa relations. The terms are used interchangeably to refer to the processes and mechanisms that create and maintain power/dominance internationally. Foucault defines biopolitics/biopower as a technology of power, implying that it is invented at a particular time, can incorporate different particular techniques and inventions, can be deployed flexibly by any agency and transmitted as know-how. Both technical and humanitarian aid are not only self-interested since they tend to actively to undermine biopower in the recipient countries. Aid
interferes crucially and specifically with bio-politics in a way that harms aid recipients quite autonomously from any economic ‘dependency’ (Kelly 2010). Power seeks to achieve a single purpose, namely the stability of the network of power relations itself. China’s ‘soft power’ policy in Africa resonates well with Foucauldian thesis in that; since power always coexist with resistance (Thiele 1986: 257), China adopts techniques and strategies that presents itself as a non-policing development partner unlike the West, in order to expand and consolidate its political and economic interests. China’s ‘global governmentality’ relies on its expressed policy of non-interference and respect for sovereignty. Power is also productive as it creates new relations that are not necessarily oppressive. To Foucault (1980: 86) power’s ‘effectiveness does not lie in placing a mere limit on desire but in constituting social rites and instruments of domination that are both tolerable and efficient’.

The article argues that China uses its ‘soft’ power as a strategy to exert its geopolitical influence both regionally and internationally. The rising of a country means the rising of its comprehensive power, among which soft power stands equal to hard power (Zhang & Jianbo 2008). Within China’s soft power diplomacy, “there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse,” (Foucault, 1980:93).

China’s presence in Africa through its ‘soft power’ and ‘oil diplomacy’ does not necessary force countries to passively submit to its maneuvers but this is often mediated by predatory leaders for their regime survival (Power & Mohan, 2010). The specific discourses, processes and mechanisms that are involved in China’s engagement with Africa resonate well with Foucauldian thesis of power and dominance. As a way of sustaining influence China has historically defended autocratic regimes that commit human rights abuses and forestall democratic reforms. It is our argument that its inclusive and non-discriminate approach to aid management that has seen it even baling out some European countries, leading in peace-keeping efforts and providing aid to all developing countries is not accidental but part of China’s political craft.

**METHODOLOGY**

Evidence is gathered through a triangulation of qualitative data collection and analytical techniques that include content analysis of purposely selected media reports, policy documents and publications on Chinese foreign aid to Zimbabwe and Botswana. A combination of Domain and Pattern Matching techniques of data analysis was used.

**DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS**

**Motives of Chinese Aid**

Stresses on donor-aided economic management or public finances albeit the raging global recession and Euro crisis in particular has made the shift towards Chinese aid even more urgent. In the global financial crisis, China has bailed European countries. China has stepped in to rescue Spain by purchasing that European country’s public debt. Spanish public debt rose to 57.7 per cent of GDP at the end of September from 53.2 per cent at the end of 2000(http://www.uncovereg.net).China has also agreed to bail out Portuguese debt amounting to USD 4 billion. Given China’s ascending global economic visibility and influence in the developed world it becomes understandable for developing countries such as Zimbabwe and Botswana to seek partnership with this emerging giant. It is not easy for Western donors given their democratic tastes of governance to continue providing aid to
African states without beinganswerable to their constituents back home. China is a command economy ruled by one party system and its government foreign policy is insulated from citizen scrutiny. This has been a constant feature in its history of international relations.

Strong relations between Zimbabwe and China date back to the 1960s and 1970s, when the Chinese Government and people firmly supported the Zimbabwean people in their fight for national liberation from British colonialism. The two countries established diplomatic relations on the very day of Zimbabwe’s independence and their relations appear unshakable. Recent Aid flows demonstratethis: US$14 million worth of urgent food aid, US$2.4 million worth of agricultural machineries, US$1.5 million worth of fertilizer, 85 vehicles and US$200 000 worth of office supplies to the Parliament (Zimbabwe Mail, 2012).

Both Zimbabwe and Botswana are endowed with abundant resources which when fully exploited and their proceeds prudently managed could make both countries economic giants of the region. The countries do not share a coherent set of motivations and opportunities for accessing Chinese aid. The need for survival under the economic crisis that followed the imposed international isolation motivated Zimbabwe to adopt the ‘Look East Policy’ while for Botswana the global recession and the need to finance infrastructural development made China a ‘new choice’. Chinese’s recent foray around the world has been guided by capital investments such as oil extraction, mining or manufacturing. It is not mere philanthropy! China needs Africa’s infrastructure and natural resources to meet phenomenal demand for raw materials by its expanding economy. As Wang (2007), observed, while China has stepped up Official Development Aid (ODA), aid flows relative to trade declined from 20-21% in 1990-1992 to 3-4% in 2004-5. The dramatic shift from ODA towards trade and investment serves to illustrate how China continues to use its ‘soft power’ and non-interference’ as a bargaining tool.

The Chinese ‘Soft Power’

Chinese ‘soft power’ is directly related to the protection and expansion of China’s national interest overseas. It is part of its ‘global governmentality’ or ‘biopolitics’ (Foucault, 2000). In recent years, Africa has become an important stage for China to enhance its soft power and shape its national image. ‘China today is so much against the use of force by any country against another country (such as Iraq or Iran). By the same token, China is against any form of meddling in the internal affairs of another country, even under the name of “human rights” or “humanitarian intervention” (as in Darfur)’ (Hsiung, 2009:22). Economic globalization following the end of the Cold War, and the rise of what Rosecrance (2006) calls “vulnerability interdependence” between nations, a feature that pervades China’s relations with the United States, the reigning hegemony, may also explain its new approach of relating with the rest of the world.

Complexities and Ambiguities

Donors often exert pressure for political and policy reasons, thereby making dependence on aid shaky and unreliable. Consequently, the rationale behind most aid disbursement decisions is usually fraught with poor judgments and inconsistencies. The disillusionment with the effectiveness of aid in influencing economic growth and development in Africa is not a new phenomenon (Carlsson, et al; 1997). Official aid is seldom the tool of altruism alone, because the direction of foreign aid is dictated by political and strategic considerations, much more than the economic needs and policy performance of the recipient. However, the motives behind aid never come in fixed and stable proportions. Countries receiving foreign aid in amounts that are sufficient to stimulate development along
the lines of Basic Human Needs mandate, are precisely the countries that are important to the
diplomatic and strategic goals of the United States. This has been a constant history of Aid:
Buz, former US Secretary for Agriculture: “Food is a weapon. It’s now one of the principal
tools in our negotiating kit” (George, 1977:17. cited in Jackson,1984).This has been the case
with Zimbabwe, where international aid for government managed programmes was stopped
after the introduction of the land reform programme and the alleged fiscal and monetary
mismanagement that followed the programme.

The problem with donor aid is that it has potential for being fungible (Devarajan &
Swaroop 1998); when the recipient country treats the entire aid as pure supplement to its
domestic resources. Aid is spent on financing other unproductive activities such as funding
political survival activities. Burnside and Dollar (2000) investigated the relationship between
foreign aid, economic policy and growth per capita using database developed by the World
Bank and concluded that aid has a positive impact on growth in developing countries with
good fiscal, monetary and trade policies but has little effect in the presence of poor policies.
Development assistance can contribute to poverty reduction in countries pursuing sound
policies(Easterly 2003; Brautigam & Knack, 2004).However for aid to positively impact on
growth, it should be directed where it can do well and conditions such as those directed
towards macroeconomic stability (low budget deficits and reduced inflation), market reforms
and privatization (Easterly, 2003) must be placed on aid.

The importance of good governance to economic development cannot be
overemphasized but the ambiguity and complexity arises when donors increase aid to those
with improving rather than deteriorating governance. Withdrawal of aid may increase the
deterioration of governance institutions in predatory and autocratic systems while at the same
it may establish an incentive for reforms in the absence of alternative sources of income. This
is however not the case given the presence of China in Africa today. China considers stability
of the political system as more important than good
governance (Dijk, 2009) and this
is not consistent with requirements of most donors operating in Africa. This creates complexities
and ambiguities for management of economies as stability without economic development
and growth can prevail under dictatorships.

The Zimbabwe Case: ‘Look East Policy’

The Zimbabwean government’s growing international unpopularity following the
controversial 2002 land reform programme and a series of disputed general elections (2000; 2002; 2005; 2008) led to the cutting of western aid to Zimbabwe prompting the search for
alternative sources of aid to sustain the economy. The economic and political meltdown
characterized by hyperinflation, with year-on-year inflation exceeding 1 000 per cent in 2006
and over 2 million per cent in July 2008, resulted in an estimated 51 per cent decline in food
and export crop production between 2000 and 2007 (IMF 2010), thus threatening household
food security (Gono, 2009; Makochekanwa & Kwaramba 2009; Murisa, 2008; Ruswa, 2004).
It also reduced capacity utilization in both mining and manufacturing sectors to as low as
18.9 per cent in 2007 (CZI, 2008), led to the collapse of the local currency in 2008 and
flooding of many Zimbabweans into neighboring countries and beyond as ‘survival’ migrants
or ‘economic refugees’ (Betts, 2010; Maphosa, 2011).

One of the main drivers of hyperinflation was the inability of the Reserve Bank of
Zimbabwe (RBZ) to withstand government pressures to finance excessive state expenditure
by printing money and its quasi-fiscal activities (Cloete and Mills 2009). Such an
environment threatened both the political and economic interests of the state and the ‘Look
East Policy’ was adopted as a survival strategy. The West’s condemnation and subsequent
isolation of Zimbabwe which was led by the Commonwealth, Britain and the United States of
America (USA) and in particular the withdrawal of support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank exacerbated the situation. When Zimbabwe was starved of aid the state became fragile as it struggled to carry out even routine activities or provide basic functions (Bird & Prowse, 2009; Guillaumont & Guillaumont-Jeanneney, 2009; Vallings & Moreno-Torres, 2005). For example, it was calculated that between 2008 and 2013 Zimbabwe would need US$3 billion in foreign aid (US$2 billion of this being debt relief) and US$235 million will be annual concessional loans for specific projects (UNDP, 2008). This would ensure economic recovery and this was not feasible without international donors. As a result we have witnessed the coevolution of the Zimbabwe’s ‘Look East’ Policy and China’s ‘non-interference’ foray of investments and development assistance in developing countries.

Public expenditures have long been considered one of the main channels through which foreign aid influences development outcomes (Devarajan & Swaroop 1998). For the Zimbabwean case, we observe, the donor and recipient preferences differed as the latter converted aid into fungible resources. One of the reasons for Zimbabwe’s recent fallout with the western donor community particularly in the last decade (2000-2010) was the different preferences regarding how aid should be spent. Thus European particularly Scandinavian donors’ push for public expenditure and political reforms as condition for assistance elicited resistance as the government was uncomfortable with such scrutiny. Western donors were not comfortable with Zimbabwe’s politicization of public expenditure management. Where any aid was made available it was channeled through civil society organizations rather than government bodies. China’s policy of ‘non-interference’ is perceived as non-threatening to political and economic sovereignty and was therefore more attractive. For example conditions attached to Western aid such as introducing budget controls, eliminating RBZ quasi-fiscal activities, liberalizing exchange rates and respect of basic human and property rights were not favorable and a threat to sovereignty.

The Botswana Case: Story of Mutual Co-existence.

Botswana, which is rated the region’s model for economic stability and democracy has benefited from large inflows of aid for decades significantly influencing the process of economic growth. This has also coincided with the beginning of economic planning which required a rational and ordered system for formulating requests for foreign aid (Maipose et al, 1997). For many years the country astutely exploited its reputation for good governance and excellent management of donor aid to obtain more assistance. But when the country achieved middle income status in 1992 certain forms of aid such as grants and concessional loans became increasingly difficult to obtain as donors turned their attention elsewhere. Not surprisingly the country is aggrieved that it has seemingly become a victim of its own success (Maipose and Somolokae, 1998).

For a country whose state is essentially developmental in character aid remains critically important as it is needed for the expansion and maintenance of existing infrastructure. In the case of Botswana the cost of financing infrastructure tend to be high because its small population is thinly spread over a vast territory. Despite its middle-income status the country does not have well developed and vibrant private sector to drive growth, and more importantly, a large segment of the population is yet to escape the poverty trap. For all these reasons foreign aid remains an important lifeline for Botswana as much as it is for Zimbabwe in spite of the radically different ways of managing their economies. In that context Chinese aid is a godsend for both countries because it bridges an important gap left by other donors, especially western countries.

When western donor aid slowed down to a trickle, not wishing to be left behind, Botswana joined the scramble for Chinese assistance which is typically rendered through
instruments such as grants, zero-interest loans and concessional loans (Davies 2007; Kalusupa 2009). Although it is difficult to quantify the flow of Chinese aid because China, unlike other Official Development Assistance (ODA) partners, does not openly declare aid to foreign countries (Kalusupa 2009:158), there is evidence that Chinese aid to Botswana has increased substantially in recent years (Mosinyi2009). This would not be inconsistent with the pledge made by China during the meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2006 to double assistance to Africa by 2009 (Davies 2007:18). Not surprisingly, and as evidenced by amongst things, attendance of the 2006 FOCAC summit by the then president, Festus Mogae, the government of Botswana has made relations with China a top priority (www.eeo.com.cn.ens/advertisements/2008/09/...112931). But much as Mogae’s visit was undoubtedly part of an effort to take cooperation to a new level, spurred on as it probably was by an increasing consciousness of the growing economic might of China, the warm relations between the two countries did not begin with him, however, since two other presidents before him had also paid visits to that country.

As indicated earlier, there is dearth of systematic data regarding official Chinese aid to Botswana, because China is reticent about disclosing such information (Kalusupa 2009). Nevertheless information garnered from a variety of sources including reports in the local newspapers, online newspapers in China and Chinese Embassy communiqués suggests that the amount and flow of Chinese aid to Botswana is increasing. In terms of cumulative figures one report suggests that Botswana has received 73 million yuan(approximately P97 million) in grants and about 1.2 billion yuan (approximately P1.6 billion) interest free loans and soft loans since 1976(Mosinyi2009). In 2009 Chinese government helped Botswana to secure a 825 million dollars loan from Standard Chartered and the state-linked Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) banks for the Morupule Expansion Project. For Botswana and China this represented a new threshold at least in terms of the sheer amount of money involved. According to Chen (2009:16) the project was ground-breaking for banks and infrastructure development in Africa especially in light of the challenges posed by the financial crisis and was the first of its kind since the ICBC secured a 20% stake in the Standard Bank in 2007. Even though it appears that lately emphasis has been on loans for financing of large infrastructural development projects, historically Chinese aid has taken different forms ranging from a modest consignment of light arms for the newly formed army in 1977(Gilks and Segal, 1985) to technical and economic assistance. One the longest running projects involving the Chinese was the rehabilitation of the north-south railway line, which started in 1985 for which China provided a concessional loan valued at P99 million and a P50 million interest-free loan (Mosinyi 2009).

As is the case with its relations with other African countries, China’s relationship with Botswana is conducted within the framework of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence (Kalusupa 2009). This approach is supposed to represent and provide an alternative to the western model of cooperation which tends to make donor countries overbearing and prescriptive especially regarding human rights and good governance. At the same time, for a country with a liberal tradition like Botswana it should raise some troubling questions.

**Effect of Chinese Aid on Development**

Like all international forms of aid, Chinese domination is not imposed but implemented by willing local elite and state complicity in the perpetuation of foreign
domination or external control in pursuit of parochial economic and political interests. However, not all Chinese aid is necessarily bad. Its aid assistance comes packaged with technical and management assistance and this significantly minimises possibilities of abuse by predatory regimes. This ensures aid is used for the purposes it was intended. China’s aid policy may be ‘soft’ but equally ‘hard’. In some cases, aid given is conditional in the sense of being tied to Chinese companies, which are obliged to use Chinese products for the projects or sometimes been tied to the export of local commodities.

The non-interference mode of engagement is not without ambiguities and challenges. The country does not work in accordance with the way the other international lenders operate in Africa as it does not stress democracy, accountability and the need to find a consensus to avoid conflicts (Dijk, 2009). This has frustrated international mechanisms to fight human rights abuses, restore democracy; peace and security in troubled or fragile states like Sudan and Zimbabwe (Manji & Marks, 2007). The ‘non-interference’ or ‘soft’ policy results in perversion of development. As in the case with Zimbabwe, such an approach is prone to be indifferent to misrule and maladministration. As Goldsmith (2001) observed foreign aid creates ‘moral hazard’ (Jackson, 1992), as it frees authorities currently in power from bearing the full consequences of the status quo. Such aid may entice authorities to be less willing to reform. China’s new aid offensive has been greeted with skepticism and concern being viewed as a ‘rogue’ creditor practising opportunistic lending (Phillips, 2006) and proliferating problematic forms of ‘rogue aid’ (Naim, 2007). However what complicates the presence of China in Southern Africa is its emerging assistance to countries that are portrayed as models of stable democracy such as Botswana.

Aid deprives the governments of the incentive to carry out essential reforms to attract much needed investments that spurs growth and reduces poverty. There is no country today that has achieved sustainable economic growth and slashed poverty by relying on aid to the extent that Africa is doing today (Moyo, 2012). Under the Chinese ‘soft’ policy, aid assistance was not tied to an overall public expenditure program of the recipient country and as a result aid intended for crucial social economic sectors often merely substitutes for spending those recipient governments would have undertaken anyway; the funds freed are spent for other purposes (Devarajan & Swaroop, 1998). Brutal regimes which are recipients of aid may not necessarily need to care about the wellbeing of their people—or, they may only do it for the purposes of satisfying donors for it is the donors’ interests that now becomes the main concern. China and recipient countries mutually rely upon each which supports Foucault’s position that power was both productive and repressive. However Chinese is not necessarily ‘rogue’ and may be more effective than Western aid as it is used for infrastructural development such as hydro-electric power dams, roads and fibre-optic projects, all which have the potential to benefit ordinary people (Sautman, 2007). China is aware, from European donors’ experiences in Africa, that corrupt leaders may convert the aid into unproductive activities.

Peace and Security

China has supported investments in such conflict-ridden and internationally ‘quarantined’ countries effectively reducing such aid into a safety net for their regimes in those countries. Such kind of isolation or targeted sanctions imposed against the Zimbabwean state leaders only served to insulate it against international criticism. The withdrawal from the Commonwealth effectively removes Zimbabwe from its agenda and thus deflating any kind of international pressure likely to be exerted on the country’s authorities. However the country could still face more stringent sanctions from the United Nations (UN) Security Council unless someone exercise the veto power to prevent such a situation. On many
occasions, during its political crisis, between 2007 and 2009 China’s veto power saved Zimbabwe from the Security Council sanctioned position (Manyeruke, 2012). This resultantly weakens any regional and international efforts for peace and security. While this ‘soft’ policy has been hailed for bringing development to many African countries it has also not helped much in building its international image.

Thus while on the face of it the Chinese framework appears to be non-problematic as it seems custom-designed to reduce possible conflict to a minimum, however, it does not auger well for long term peace, security and development in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Mhango 2012). For countries like Botswana these are confusing and disorienting times. Historically, the country benefited from its good human rights record and sound management of donor aid especially when western countries were the main providers of aid. However, its new benefactor, China, dispenses aid and conducts international relations on an entirely different basis. Even though for a long-time Botswana avoided criticising other countries openly for anti-democratic behaviour or human rights abuses, the country broke with that tradition in 2008 when it started advocating that SADC should abandon quiet diplomacy in respect of Zimbabwe (Dingake 2011). It is interesting that while Botswana’s shift towards megaphone diplomacy met with approval in western capitals it is not consistent with the Chinese way of doing things though thus far there is no evidence that it has affected relations. Confusingly though, Botswana seems recently to have fallen into step with other SADC countries as regards Zimbabwe even if it still maintains the same posture regarding what it considers errant governments in other parts of the world.

CONCLUSIONS

Local and international responses to the growing Chinese influence have been mixed. Chinese enterprise in Africa is hailed for bringing massive infrastructural development to the continent and at the same time accused of killing local enterprises and thus worsening unemployment, poverty and inequality. The non-interference mode of engagement is not without ambiguities and challenges. It has frustrated international mechanisms to fight human rights abuses, restore democracy; peace and security in troubled or fragile states like Zimbabwe. China has supported investments in such conflict-ridden and internationally ‘quarantined’ countries effectively reducing such aid into a safety net for regimes in those countries. Ironically, countries that are portrayed as models of stable democracy such as Botswana have also recently become one of its aid recipients. For a region in search of ‘new’ development and governance models in the context of globalization and economic reforms, it is important to pay both scholarly and practical attention to the emerging complexities and ambiguities of Chinese aid.

China’s policy of non-interference and ‘untying’ aid brings hope to most developing countries in Africa while at the same raising concerns from the western world particularly the European community. Aid flows must be managed effectively in order to prevent countries becoming aid-dependent. Withdrawal of Aid to Zimbabwe has the potential to deepen the problem where the state may adopt survival strategies in response to the international isolation. This article also confirms previous observation (Chauvet & Collier 2005) that, donor aid particularly Chinese one has been largely ineffective in inducing policy reforms or generating a sustained turnaround of failed states. China’s aid in the form of donations and concessional grants to both internationally ‘quarantined’ countries like Zimbabwe and regional models of democracy and stability such as Botswana effectively creates complexities and ambiguities for international relations, regional peace and security. However the growing influence and dominance of Chinese ‘soft’ power in Southern Africa
could assist in stepping up efforts for reform. The international community may use China’s new strategic position to influence change in the management of both aid and economies in countries that have already exhausted ‘quarantine’ exit options such as Zimbabwe.

REFERENCES


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