



**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES  
MASTERS IN DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES**

**A STUDY ON THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF MILITARY CONSCRIPTION:  
THE CASE OF MOZAMBIQUE**

**BY**

**JOSÉ DOMINGOS BENJAMIM CANAMALA**

**STUDENT ID: 201308177**

**SUPERVISOR**

**PROFESSOR Z. MAUNDENI**

**August, 2017**

## **DECLARATION**

This study is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University. I may have involved others in discussion of the study and sought advices and suggestions, but the study is my original work and is neither copied from another source without proper acknowledgement, nor written for me by another person, in whole or in part.

---

**Author's Signature**

---

**Date**

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My profound gratitude and appreciation go to **Professor Zibani Maundeni**, my Supervisor who knowledgeablely gave me sound guidance, responsible support, and inspiration throughout different stages of this essay. I also would like to express my sincere gratitude to the High Command of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF), for having granted a slot to the 'Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique – the Mozambique Defence Forces – for the *p.sc.* Course at Defence Command and Staff College (DCSC) a college affiliated to the University of Botswana (UB) where I qualified to pursue the Master's Degree in Defence and Strategic Studies. In the same vein my gratitude goes to the High Command of the 'Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique' for having allowed me to pursue the Masters of Defence and Strategic Studies (MDSS) at the University of Botswana as one of the first SADC pioneers.

I would also like to, sincerely, thank and acknowledge the important contributions of all the staff at the DCSC. I would also like to thank profoundly Major Okgethilwe Samuel Tselayakhumo from Class 6 of 2013 and Major Mohurutshe Lekwape from Class 7 of 2014 for their language review. I have discussed many times with Lekwape concerning our classes and especially on the topic, he was always ready to support me whenever possible up to the final version. My further gratitude goes to the DCSC library staff that patiently assisted me to locate relevant materials for this project. Hence, they assisted me to make this research project a success. I would also like to thank the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the UB for having shed some light as regards the approach to this research. My highest appreciation and commendation goes to the all UB lecturers who made me understand concepts and issues related to National and International Security, Peacekeeping, International Relations (IR), Law of Armed Conflict, Media Relations and Communications. From our lectures, I owe the utmost gratitude to **Dr G. Mokhawa** who, from her lectures in the subject of Security, Peace and Conflict, I spotted the problem as she delivered the lectures. I am also grateful to many friends whose names cannot be divulged for personal reasons.

Last but not the least; I thank all my relatives for their incomparable side by side assistance in taking care of my sick father while I was undergoing my studies in Botswana.

## DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my late mother Joana Jofrisse Nhanzulula and father Domingos Benjamim Canamala who left me pursuing the Master degree. Special dedication goes to my children Franklin De Gusmão, the twins Joana Da Cruz and Deolinda Da Cruz, Misteja da Graça and to the last born daughter Dominique Da Íris because it follows that:

*The heights by great men reached and kept were not attained by sudden flight, but they, while their companions slept, were toiling upward in the night.*

*The talent of success is nothing more than doing what you can do well, and doing well whatever you do without thought of fame. If it comes at all it will come because it is deserved, not because it is sought after (Kalusopa, 2011).*

With Kalusopa's verses I wish to inspire my children to read thoughtfully the books as they take a move in their academic paths, because in academia, success comes from being an intelligent reader.

Final dedication goes to my wife Percida for her moral support and encouragement throughout my studies and for taking care of the family in my absence from Maputo, the capital city of the Republic of Mozambique. May God Bless you all!!!!

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents	Page
DECLARATION -----	1
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS -----	2
DEDICATION -----	3
TABLE OF CONTENTS -----	4
ABSTRACT -----	7
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS -----	8
<b>CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION</b> -----	<b>10</b>
1.1. Introduction -----	10
1.2. Background of the Study -----	12
1.2.1. <i>Military Conscription in Mozambique</i> -----	12
1.3. Statement of the Research Problem -----	13
1.4. Research Questions -----	14
1.5. Objectives of the Research -----	14
1.6. Definition of the Key Words -----	14
1.7. Significance of the Study -----	15
1.8. Motivation -----	15
1.9. Delimitations of the Study -----	16
1.10. Structure of the Study -----	16
<b>CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW</b> -----	<b>17</b>
2.1. Introduction -----	17
2.2. Studies on Ex-Combatants in Africa -----	17
2.2.1. Ex-Combatants in Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Sierra Leone -----	17
2.2.2. Ex-Combatants in Zimbabwe -----	19
2.2.2.1. Militarisation of the Society and the Public Services -----	21
2.7. Conclusion -----	22
<b>CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY</b> -----	<b>23</b>
3.1. Introduction -----	23
3.2. Research design -----	24

3.3.	Israel Military Conscription Policy and the Discharge Procedures -----	24
3.4.	Realism Theory -----	28
3.5.	Blowback Theory -----	29
3.6.	Data Collection Instruments -----	31
3.7.	Ethical Considerations -----	32
3.4.	Limitations of the Study -----	32
<b>CHAPTER 4 – THE BENEFITS OF MILITARY CONSCRIPTION -----</b>		<b>33</b>
4.1.	Introduction -----	33
4.2.	Benefits of Military Conscription during the Colonial Period -----	33
4.2.1.	<i>Universal Military Conscription</i> -----	35
4.2.2.	<i>General Militarisation</i> -----	35
4.2.3	<i>Benefits of Conscripting Africans in the Portuguese army</i> -----	36
4.3.	Benefits of Military Conscription during the Struggle for the Independence -	37
4.4.	Benefits of Militarisation after Independence -----	38
4.5.	Benefits of Militarisation During the Civil-War Period -----	38
4.6.	Conclusion -----	39
<b>CHAPTER 5 – THE SECURITY COSTS OF MILITARY CONSCRIPTION -----</b>		<b>40</b>
5.1.	Introduction -----	40
5.2.	The Costs of Military Conscription before and after the Independence -----	40
5.2.1.	<i>Militarisation of the Public Services</i> -----	43
5.3.	The Costs of Military Conscription during the Civil-War -----	44
5.4.	The Costs of Poor Demobilisation after the Civil War -----	48
5.4.1.	<i>Inaccurate DDR Post-Civil War</i> -----	48
5.5.	Conclusion -----	51
<b>CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION -----</b>		<b>52</b>
6.1.	Introduction -----	52
6.2.	Summary of the study -----	52
6.3.	Findings of the Study -----	52
6.4.	Recommendations -----	53
6.5.	Concluding Remarks -----	54

<b>7. REFERENCES</b> .....	56
<b>8. ANNEXES</b> .....	60
A. Table 3 Records of Renamo Armed Violence Post-2009 .....	60
B. Records of Criminal Activities by Various Armed Gangs .....	66

## **ABSTRACT**

This study considers the security benefits and costs associated with military conscription in Mozambique. Mozambique has been conscripting young people into the army since Portuguese occupation of the territory several centuries ago. It employs realism and blow back theories. The study shows that while conscription boosted the fighting power of the Portuguese colonial government and that of the FRELIMO liberation movement, it has worsened Mozambican security after the country's independence. It also shows that those that were conscripted to fight for Portugal were later abandoned by the new system, driving them into an insurgency that exposed the country to insecurity and devastated the economy. The study further shows that over the years, many new conscripts have equally been abandoned to their own devices, exposing the country to criminality of high magnitude. But the study further shows that models of conscriptions exist from which Mozambique could learn from in order to enjoy the security benefits of conscription.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BDF	Botswana Defence Forces
BR	Boletim da República (Official Report or Bulletin of the Republic)
DCSC	Defence Command and Staff College
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FADM	Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique
FAM	Mozambique Armed Forces
FARDC	Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FPLM	People's Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique
FRELIMO	Front for the Liberation of Mozambique
GPA	General Peace Agreement
IDF	Israel Defence Force
IR	International Relations
LPA	Lusaka Peace Agreement
NDSC	National Defence and Security Council
MC	Military Conscription
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilisation, and Reintegration Programme
MDSS	Masters of Defence and Strategic Studies
MHN	Mozambique History Net
MND	Ministry of the National Defence
MNR	Mozambique National Resistance
MPLA	People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MPs	Members of Parliament
MPS	Militarisation of Public Services
NSS	National Security Strategy
OALDCE	Oxford Advanced Learners' Dictionary of Current English
ONUMOZ	Organization of the United Nations for Mozambique
PRM	Police of the Republic of Mozambique
PSC	Passed Staff Course
PSP	Police of Public Security
Renamo/MNR	Mozambique National Resistance

SACOD	South African Concise Oxford Dictionary
SADC	Southern African Development Community
TVM	Television of Mozambique
UB	University of Botswana
UN	United Nations
UNDDR	United Nation Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
UNDPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDIR	United Nation Institute for Disarmament Research
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
ZIPRA	Zimbabwean People's Revolutionary Army
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU-(PF)	Zimbabwe African National Unity-Patriotic Front

## CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

### 1.1. Introduction

This research essay discusses the implications of military conscription on security in Mozambique. Conscripts are a sub-set of ex-combatants. In the case of Mozambique, conscription is a formal policy of the state requiring all eligible young people in the country to serve in the armed forces for a specified period of time.

For example, the deputy chief of human resources in the Ministry of the National Defence (MND), interviewed by “Televisão de Moçambique (TVM)”, Television of Mozambique, on 5<sup>th</sup> January 2015, indicated that the MND intended to enlist 4,500 new conscripts for the Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique (FADM) in 2015, (TVM, Bom dia Moçambique<sup>1</sup>, 5 de Janeiro de 2015). Taking this number to be the standard for the last five years, it means there had been 22,500 conscripts in the last five years.

#### **Conscripted soldiers based on a plan of the Ministry of Defence for the year of 2015.**

SN	Year of conscription	Conscripted	Conscripts for permanent staff	Integrated ex-conscripts	Non-integrated ex-conscripts
1	2010	4500	1800	1100	1600
2	2011	4500	1800	1100	1600
3	2012	4500	1800	1100	1600
4	2013	4500	1800	1100	1600
5	2014	4500	1800	1100	1600
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>22,500</b>	<b>9,000</b>	<b>5,500</b>	<b>8,000</b>

(Source TVM, Bom Dia Moçambique, 5<sup>th</sup> January of 2015)

The numbers of conscripted soldiers are from the real number of the conscripts that the Ministry of the National Defence announced according to the plan for the year of 2015. The country was adding 22,500 more military trained individuals every five years.

Unlike normal ex-combatants who may have bargaining power in exchanging their weapons for re-integration packages, conscripts have no weapons to bargain with in exchange for better integration deals. Thus, ex-conscripts (in this case, only young people of school going

---

<sup>1</sup> Bom dia Moçambique is a morning State Television program where the presenter (of TVM – Television of Mozambique) interviews a chosen individual or panel according to the important event of the day, week month or a period.

age who acquire basic military training, and have neither ranks and nor membership in insurgencies. They are different from the general ex-combatants of different ages and ranks, who belong to different insurgencies and state security agencies. The latter may have committed atrocities and may not be welcome into their societies. They may have voluntarily or involuntarily participated in violent armed conflicts and, as a result, may have the power to negotiate better integration deals, or who have the option of re-joining armed groups if they are dissatisfied with their integration packages.

*From the government army the following groups were produced:*

- i. Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (*FRELIMO*)'s popular militia (non-integrated)
- ii. The armed population for self-defence programmes to counter the civil war insecurity
- iii. Child soldiers
- iv. Former Armed Forces of Mozambique (Ex-FAM) conscripted soldiers who were not integrated after the civil war)
- v. Former People's Forces for Liberation of Mozambique (Ex-FPLM) soldiers who were integrated after the civil war; these are the veterans who enjoy a better status as they are seen as having taken part in the liberation war.

*And from the National Resistance of Mozambique's (RENAMO) side the following are the identified groups;*

- vi. The child soldiers
- vii. Non-integrated ex-combatants (from the insurgency)
- viii. Integrated ex-combatants (from the insurgency), and
- ix. The militias (the so called majubas).

The essay sets out to analyse benefits and costs of Mozambique's ex-combatants, with special emphasis on the ex-conscripts. It is aimed at analysing the security benefits and costs of having ex-conscripts, particularly the benefits and costs of discharging large numbers of young conscripts and releasing them into the society every year. The analysis uses the realist theory to help it examine the security benefits, and the blowback theory to help it examine the un-intended security costs of discharging young ex-conscripts. For this reason, this study draws from the experiences of Israel that has had a long history of beneficial conscription that partly helped it to become a military power in the Middle East. It is this experience that is

used to analyse the benefits and costs of conscription for Mozambique. While experiences of countries that have had large numbers of ex-combatants and experienced demobilisation and integration challenges are useful, they are not the main focus of this research. This current research primarily focuses on conscription, and whether or not it is being handled well in Mozambique.

## **1.2. Background to the Study**

### **1.2.1. Military Conscription in Mozambique**

Bjørn (1995, p.88), defines military conscription as the obligatory enrolment of personnel for national service. This mandatory national service, Bjørn (1995) asserts, is commonly applied in the case of regular armed forces. Bjørn (1995) goes on to define the term military conscription as regulated obligatory enrolment of human resources for regular armed forces. The main objective of military conscription, as Bjørn (1995) further clarifies, is to resource the defence organisation with human resource capabilities in order to fulfil and maintain the objectives of national security.

Prior to, and during World Wars I and II as well as during and after the Cold War, military conscription was one of the many ways of recruiting personnel for the military. In Mozambique, the obligatory conscription law of 1978 was put into force during the Civil-War (1976-1992) as a response to the military needs of the time. This law was amended in 1997 to introduce guidelines in terms of minimum age for military conscription which was fixed at 18, the period in which the recruitment for the conscription takes place being January to February of the next year, as well as issues such as the medical and physical examination as a pre-requisite for recruitment. This research does not discuss conscription as a recruitment strategy for armed insurgencies; it studies how the government handles conscription and the benefits or threats that are associated with the government's conscription policies.

The attainment of democracy in Mozambique in the 1990s and consequent change of the constitution resulted in the review and introduction of significant changes to the conscription system. In 2009 a new conscription law was introduced and it was called *Law of Military Service*, to replace the 1997's *Law of Obligatory Military Service*. The *Law of Military Service* also brought more innovations. It was no longer "obligatory", though it requires all citizens of the ages from 18 to 35 years to undergo conscription (Law 32/2009)

The literature review shows that international agencies and research institutes have largely focused on dis-armament, demobilisation and integration of ex-combatants. For example, the United Nations (UN) and other bodies at either international or regional level have developed and applied disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programs to prevent any outbreak of war and take care of the ex-combatants and/or child soldiers. However, it seems that the issues of integration of ex-conscripts who served in the military in peacetime have been neglected. Looking at the above reviews none focused on the issue of ex-conscripts and its security implications.

Worldwide, it has been found that most of security problems such as abduction, armed robbery, and narcotics, all of which adopt tactics and equipment used in the armed forces, tend to increase in situations where there were large numbers of ex-combatants. But not much is known about situations where there are large numbers of ex-conscripts such as in Israel and Mozambique. This research tries to make that extension and analyses the security benefits of, or threats posed by conscription.

Insurgencies, revolts or uprisings against elected governments taking place in Africa and elsewhere in the world are due to problems associated with state failure or collapse and ex-combatants. Government ex-conscripts have not been given specific attention and this research fills that gap. Building a government army is directly linked to the concept of statehood. Armed forces serve as instruments of states for the protection of their internal or external interests. Internal interests include national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and citizen security, all of which are protected against any external aggression and/or internal wars. As such conscription could be justified. However, later in this study I will argue that internal security threats in a country that employs conscription may be directly or indirectly linked to the poor handling of ex-conscripts, particularly if their integration and monitoring is poor.

### **1.3. Statement of the Research Problem**

According to the Law of Military Conscription of Mozambique, conscripted soldiers are discharged after two years of service in the armed forces (Art. 30 (1) of the Law 32/2009). After the discharge, the law provides for their integration and monitoring once they are in the society. The integration and monitoring are meant to allow the government (armed forces) to be able to locate these individuals for future mobilisation if the military needs of the country dictate. As long as conscripts do not have to apply to be part of the permanent staff of the

security agencies, and the law allows them to be discharged, there will always be militarily trained young individuals who may not have been properly integrated into the society and may pose a security threat to the state and the society.

Currently thousands of conscripted young soldiers are being discharged from the military establishment every year (Law 32/2009). The large numbers of ex-conscripts who are not well provided for and who are not monitored, calls for research to establish the potential security benefits and costs. This study proposes to examine the benefits and costs of conscripting young people into the army and then abandoning them to their own devices.

#### 1.4. **Research Questions**

The study attempts to answer the following questions:

1. What security benefits does Mozambique gain from conscription?
2. What security costs does Mozambique incur from conscription?
3. How could Mozambique increase the benefits and reduce the costs of conscription?

#### 1.5. **Objectives of the Study**

The main objective of the research is:

1. To investigate what security gains, historically, Mozambique derived from conscription.
2. To investigate what security costs it incurred from conscription.
3. To help Mozambique find a way of increasing the benefits and of reducing the costs of conscription.

#### 1.6. **Definitions of Key Words**

**Conscription** – obligatory military service established by law or policy in a country also called mandatory military service and draft, usually contrasted with volunteer service (Dictionary of Military Terms, 2003; Webster Comprehensive Dictionary, 2000).

**Conscript** – a person enlisted compulsorily in the armed forces. Usually the person serves for 2 or more years depending on the military needs or conscription laws of a particular country. In some countries terms such as ‘compulsorily enlisted soldier’, ‘draftee’ or ‘recruit’ are used (ibid).

***Ex-Conscript*** or ***Former Conscript*** – refers to the conscript who has already served in the armed forces and has been discharged from military to the civil life, sometimes subject to be re-recruited in case of military needs.

***Reintegration*** – It is the process of placing ex-conscripts in schools and/or new jobs either in the government institutions or in the private sector as well as providing self-supporting opportunities. During this process “ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income”, (United Nations, 2010, p.4).

### **1.7. Significance of the Study**

The Government of the Republic of Mozambique follows democratic principles, especially those concerned with the Human Rights, such as freedom of speech found in Article 43 of the Constitution. It allows public and academic debates about issues of governance and policy making; it is within this context that this research is situated, and focuses on the conscription policy as it relates to re-integration and monitoring of ex-conscripts in Mozambique, especially in the context of the insecurity that the country has been experiencing recently. This study aims to contribute to the formulation of policies and programmes for the reintegration and monitoring of ex-conscripts in order to minimise or eliminate security threats that may arise from the failure to implement conscription properly. While most research has focused on developing peace and stability policies and integration of war veterans and combatants of rebel movements, ex-conscripts have been ignored, so this research fills that gap.

### **1.8. Motivations**

This study is motivated by the fact that the *Military Conscription Policy of the Republic of Mozambique* has been amended several times, yet the country still suffers insecurity from insurgencies, and violent crimes. The Constitution of Mozambique was amended in 2004 while the Law of Military Conscription was also revised and amended in 2009. The main argument is that if ex-conscripts are not well integrated and monitored, they can pose a security threat to the nation. While the state is driven by the desire to maintain a strong military capability that has the potential to defend or promote national interests (New Oxford American Dictionary 2007), the same state must be aware of the negative implications of discharging ex-conscripts without providing for their welfare and monitoring them because they can be a security threat.

### **1.9. Delimitations of the Study**

This study only focuses on ex-conscripts of the Normal Active Duty of the Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique (FADM). The study makes use of any policy, guidelines, laws and regulations that affect the process of reintegrating and monitoring of ex-conscripts in the society to assess the benefits and costs of conscription. Here, the issue of costs is not an economic one. It is not assessing how much money the Mozambican government spends or loses from conscription. Rather, costs here are used in political and security terms to measure the un-intended security implications of having large numbers of ex-conscripts. Here, costs refer to any challenges arising from the failure to handle conscription appropriately. This study has no political motivation, neither does it intend to criticise conscription as a policy, but to explain the un-intended security implications of mishandling it.

### **1.10. Structure of the Study**

This study is made up of five chapters organised in the following manner: Chapter 1 provides the introduction and background of the study. It states the research problem, outlines the aims and objectives of the study, highlights the significance, hypotheses and motivations of the study.

Chapter 2 presents the Literature Review of the study. It considers the benefits and costs of conscription. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology employed in this study. It discusses how the concepts of realist theory and of blowback theory are operationalised in the study. Chapter 4 examines the benefits of military conscription. Chapter 5 examines the security costs of conscription. It particularly focusses on the unintended consequences of conscription. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the study by providing recommendations on how the country could increase the benefits of conscription and reduce the security costs associated with it.

## CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1. Introduction

Most literature on combatants focuses on disarming, demobilising and integrating ex-combatants who come from different backgrounds. Such ex-combatants come from insurgencies that have participated in cease-fires and have accepted peace accords and are willing to either join government armies or other state security institutions, or integrate into the civilian population. Often, such ex-fighters either join government forces with their equipment and are inserted into army ranks, or trade their weapons for exit-packages aimed at helping them integrate into civilian life. Often, ex-conscripts are missed in such literature and have not been seen as an issue warranting research.

### 2.2. Studies on Ex-Combatants in Africa

International organisations such as the UN, the International Labour Organisation, World Bank, and research institutes around the world, have produced a number of reports on integrating ex-combatants. A catalyst was the 1992 UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali's 'Agenda for Peace', which sought to re-define the role of the UN in promoting international peace, and included 'post-conflict peace-building'. Consequently, the UN, through a number of its agencies, especially the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) began to increasingly focus on DDR (Lamb et al., 2012: p.7). In a report entitled *Assessing the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the Context of Instability and Informal Economies*, Lamb et al. (2012, p.8) also reports that "The UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) established a Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, which led to a number of DDR-related publications, with disarmament being the main focus". Lamb et al. (2012), report that the World Bank and several universities conducted research on DDR and published numerous technical reports in that regard.

#### 2.2.1. Ex-Combatants in Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Sierra Leone

In a series of reports titled *Rumours of Peace and Whispers of War*, (Lamb et al., 2012) have studied reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life in the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Sierra Leone, and other countries. They report that in most instances, integration of ex-combatants is financed by a collection of donors even though the

funds are never enough to make integration a success. In contrast, conscription is a governmental policy that has no donor supporters and in which ex-conscripts have no weapons to trade in for better exit packages. Ex-conscripts are often young people who, against their will, are legally required to serve in the government military for a short period of time and are officially disarmed and dispossessed of any weapons, and are therefore not in a position to bargain for a better exit package. These are young people who can still go to school and may not necessarily be ready to join the labour market where un-employment levels are already high.

In the Introduction of *Rumours of Peace, Whispers of War*, Lamb and colleagues (2012: 1) note this about ex-combatants in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): “Former combatants are prominent in the security and stability equation in the eastern DRC. The reason is that if this section of society has not been effectively disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated into civilian life, they have the potential to return to arms. In this region, over 100,000 ex-combatants have been demobilised over the past decade in successive waves of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) interventions”. While it is clear that there is a programme for disarming combatants in DRC, the same cannot be said about ex-conscripts. They are not seen as a security threat as they have no former insurgencies to return to, no weapons to threaten anybody with, and no leaders to mobilise them into the kind of threat that other ex-military groups may pose. Ex-conscripts are young, very vulnerable, and small in numbers. They have military training, but no weapons which they can exchange for good exit packages.

States or regions (with the financial support of the international community) have failed to properly reintegrate ex-combatants and exposed themselves to internal and regional dangers, to economic disruptions, to violent crime, and that all these worked against national and regional interests, and weakened their standing in the international arena. Development agencies such as the World Bank and the UN have participated in DDR exercises in order to try to promote peace and enable development to occur.

The Multi-Country Demobilisation, and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) was launched in 2002 and was supported by a range of donor governments and agencies. Its geographical focus was the greater Great Lakes region of central Africa, with specific countries being: Angola, Burundi, Central Africa Republic, the DRC, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda. The MDRP coordinated, and provided assistance to,

close to 300,000 ex-combatants in these countries, and was concluded in June 2009 (Lamb et al., 2012:5).

Despite large sums of money poured into the region and in support of re-integration, it is a known fact that this region is still characterised by insecurity, economic turmoil, armed insurgencies and so. If funded re-integration processes failed, what more of poorly funded re-integration of ex-conscripts who hardly attract the attention of the international world.

In most countries emerging from war, the formal sector is small and already saturated and has no potential for employment growth. If ex-combatants are to be re-integrated, the informal sector is the only option (Lamb et al., 2012). This has been the case in Burundi, the Central Africa Republic, the DRC, and South Sudan. In the DRC, ex-combatants from different armed groups have entered into joint ventures in the informal sector and have made life better for themselves, amidst insecurities of all sorts. There are also reports that the informal sectors of many post-war countries are exposed to dangers of insecurity, over taxation by government and insurgencies, ambushes and the like. Ex-combatants have been murdered in such situations, prompting some to go back to an armed life. Ex-combatants have also deserted government armies, as in the DRC.

There have been reports of demobilised ex-combatants (who benefited from DDR initiatives) becoming associated with, or re-joining armed groups, mainly in some mining areas. The ‘recycling’ of demobilised combatants has been particularly problematic in relation to the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) integration process...dissatisfied former armed group members who had been incorporated into the government armed forces, deserted and returned to their previous armed group or joined/created a new one (Lamb et al., 2012: 26).

Lamb and his team of researchers identified the following as important factors leading to ex-combatants deserting the government army: perceived discrimination within the FARDC, loss of access to lucrative mining sites by FARDC factions, flawed security sector reforms, and the allure of the armed group.

### **2.2.2. Ex-Combatants in Zimbabwe**

Other countries such as Zimbabwe have previously failed in their re-integration process despite international funding and stable economies at the time. At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe failed to reintegrate and to demobilise its armed factions, namely the

Rhodesian soldiers, Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) forces. All three had ex-combatants who could be absorbed into the army, the police force and other security forces in the country, or be demobilised and reintegrated into society. The formation of the Joint High Command for the formation, demobilisation and reintegration of all the guerrilla forces and the Rhodesian Forces was meant to ease the difficult processes and to help make it equitable. But with ZANU (PF) in power, ZANLA forces gained the upper hand in the distribution of power, gradually taking over most of the senior positions in the integrated army, police force and public service, and drove out members of the forces whose political parties had lost the elections. When the Rhodesians emigrated, the ZIPRA forces formed an insurgency that had been put down violently. To give high status to ZANLA ex-combatants, the ruling party conferred special status to itself and its guerrilla as the basis for the formation of the nation state, which promoted ZANU (PF) through songs and slogans, (Kriger, 2003, pp. 74-75). The ruling party guerrillas were granted a dominant status and many other rights by the ruling party. In the DRC, Sierra Leone and others, ex-combatants deserted the government armies they had joined when they felt discriminated against.

Sometimes the parent parties that have armed wings deliberately carry out activities that lead to failure in the disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration exercises. For example, in Zimbabwe the poor handling of ex-combatants started even before independence. It started during Disarmament, Demobilisation and Integration phases which were characterised by many conflicts among the parties, their guerrillas and the Rhodesian Forces. Initially, the incoming ruling party violated the agreements by not assembling its ZANLA forces, claiming that the guerrillas should not be assembled for instance, Tony Rich (1982) (cited in Kriger 2005) states:

... it was necessary for ZANLA cadres to stay out of the assembly points to protect their supporters, but it was also a vital part of ZANU (PF)'s strategy, given the possibility of an air strike against the assembly points. By keeping a guerrilla presence among the rural population ZANU (PF) ensured that the gains made over the long years of armed struggle would not be eroded; and it also allowed them the opportunity to intensify their campaigning. (Kriger, 2005, pp.5-6)

The violation of the agreed procedures showed that the ruling party-to-be, had a hidden agenda for the future of the party and the country. (It was later found that ZIPRA had done the

same, hiding weapons and men that were later used in an insurgency in the early 1980s). For its part, ZANU (PF) used its former guerrillas (in the security institutions, in the public sector and in the society) to maintain its power in the country and to alienate combatants of the other parties. Former ZANLA combatants have also been used in violent election campaigns that the party has won over the years.

According to Kriger (2005) “In July 2004, Mugabe warned the youth, as in the past, that they must campaign vigorously — code for violence — to defend the nation. If ZANU lost the elections, they would be to blame” and “Soldiers have allegedly been selectively withdrawn from the army to spearhead the campaign” (p.32).

Thus, not only do some countries deliberately fail to integrate or properly demobilise ex-combatants, they use them for violent political activities in the post war period. In contrast, ex-conscripts generally remain invisible. Ex-conscripts have no visible trail because they have no ideological attachments to the ruling parties; they remain vulnerable to anybody who wants to recruit them to form an insurgency. This research therefore focuses on ex-conscripts to foreground their experiences and make them visible in international security related debates.

Ex-combatants can also influence the setting up of important state institutions. According to Manungo (2007) the National Security Council and the Defence Council of Zimbabwe are the drivers of the National Security Policy of Zimbabwe, yet they have neither civilian representatives nor civil society representatives (p.228). All their members are ex-combatants. Ex-combatants have also influenced states such as Zimbabwe, Angola and Rwanda to have an interventionist state outlook (see Manungo, 2007, pp.228-229). In contrast, ex-conscripts have no influence on the important institutions of the state and have no influence on the state’s outlook. As said before, they remain invisible.

#### **2.2.2.1. Militarisation of the Society and the Public Services**

In many countries, ex-combatants have also been used to militarise the police force. The institution of law enforcement is one of the institutions that, becomes militarised in almost in every country if the security of the country recruits many ex-combatants, is under threat or militarism becomes the dominant ideology of the government. Mariscal (2003), (as cited in Giroux, 2004), pointed out that:

In liberal democracies, in particular, the values of militarism do not reside in a single group but are diffused across a wide variety of cultural locations. In twenty-first century America, no one is exempt from militaristic values because the process of militarisation allows those values to permeate the fabric of everyday life.

What this means is that in militarised liberal societies, members of the public are armed and are no push-overs. For example, Lesotho is one of the few known cases of armed publics in Africa. In armed republics, the security forces always have to tread with care, and are always armed and shoot-outs are common. Compare that with the electoral period of 2011 in Zimbabwe where Tandare 2007 as cited in Dissel and Frank (2012, p.186) state that the “police have routinely used excessive force to disperse peaceful demonstration, including the use of live ammunitions, which resulted in the death of an MDC supporter”. Violently dispersing peaceful demonstrators is a sign of a militarised state that sees every demonstration or protest, no matter how peaceful, as a threat to state power. Chitiyo (2009) noted that by 2008 key state institutions in Zimbabwe were militarised because the public service had military personnel, mostly those who have taken part in the liberation struggle, as heads, either in active duty or in reserve/retired Senior Officers and Generals of the Zimbabwe National Army. In contrast, the role played by ex-conscripts in police forces is relatively unknown and this calls for a research that could assess their role. This study focuses on Mozambique’s ex-conscripts and how they have been integrated into the armed forces as well as civilian life. This is because there is a dearth of literature on the merits and demerits of conscription in general, and on the handling of the reintegration of ex-conscripts into the society in particular.

### **2.3. Conclusion**

This chapter on literature review has tried to distinguish ex-conscripts from ex-combatants and showed that studies have focused on the latter and have ignored the former. Ex-combatants are visible in scholarship as they have been studied extensively and their role in the armed forces and civilian life has been documented. Their presence has attracted international organisations and government around the world. The studies show that the poor integration of ex-combatants has resulted in security crises for the states concerned. In contrast, ex-conscripts have remained invisible and un-researched, and policies or lack thereof have not been explored to examine the security benefits or costs of conscription. It is the purpose of this study to shed light on the existence of ex-conscripts in Mozambique and to foreground their experiences and how they have been integrated into civilian life.

## CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY

### 3.1. Introduction

This chapter outlines the theoretical framework and the methodology used in the study. It adopts realism and blowback in the study of ex-conscripts in Mozambique. These theories serve as frameworks of analysis that help to conduct a systematic analysis of issues surrounding ex-conscripts. The use of realism is to show that conscription has enormous benefits if properly implemented, and the use of blow back theory is to show that it can have damaging consequences if the country fails to implement it properly. The choice of realism, for instance was based on its basic assumptions that; [1] the primary concern of the state is survival; [2] international system is anarchic and; [3] states are unitary and rational actors (Reus-Smit, 2001). The organisation of a country's hard power, lies in [4] depends on geographical size, natural resources, economy, military, technological development and population. It is on the basis of these assumptions that a nation/state develops a powerful army to secure its interests and to confer power to the state.

While realism points to the building of state power and to the usefulness of conscription, the blowback theory points to the unplanned consequences of policies which are either kept secret from the people or are implemented poorly. This theory is applied in this research to highlight the unintended consequences of military conscription, such as creating insecurity in Mozambique, fuelling insurgency and promoting violent crime.

According to Kalusopa & Ngulube (2011) “several authors contend that it is essential to state the research design and methodology because research design and/or methodology is a plan that provides the overall framework for collecting data and also allows the researcher to draw conclusions among variables” (p.123) (...) and, “... once the problem has been correctly formulated, a methodology is developed in order to provide a format for the detailed steps in a study”, (p.123). Accordingly, this leads the researcher to take “decisions regarding what, where, when, how much, by what means concerning an inquiry or a research study” (Kalusopa & Ngulube, 2011, p.123).

Here, our hypothesis is that states that mishandle conscription may suffer the costs of such action as the blowback theory predicts. The blowback theory claims that policies which are kept secret or are poorly implemented can have the unexpected results that lead to adverse

security outcomes. This theory will help us understand that conscription may have unintended outcomes. .

### **3.2. Research Design**

Some policy-makers and researchers might look at intended outcomes of policies, while others, such as strategists might look at both intended and unintended consequences of policies in order to predict bad outcomes and put in place measures to mitigate these outcomes. Interdisciplinary research on military conscription has been conducted from different perspectives and different aspects of conscription. For example, Pfaffenzeller (2014) examined the relationship between conscription and democracy; Konstantinidis (2011) focussed on the political economy of military conscription policy; Poutvaara and Wagener (2006) focussed on the political allure of and the economic costs associated with conscription; Galiani *et al.*, (2007) and MacLean, A. and G. H. Elder Jr (2007) examines developing criminal records of conscripts after their military service, especially how participation in the military service increased the likelihood of becoming a criminal in adulthood, particularly in property and arms-related crimes... and Siminski, P., et al. (2014) examined “the effects of military service on crime using the exogenous variation provided by Australia’s Vietnam-era conscription lotteries”.

### **3.3. Israel Military Conscription Policy and the Discharge Procedures**

Our argument is that if properly handled, conscription promises enormous benefits to a state pursuing militarism as a state policy. Here we rely on the experiences of Israel to argue this point. So, how does Israel handle its conscripted soldiers post service and how does this help it to pursue militarism? The Israel Defence Force (I.D.F.) is one of the most respected armies in the world and it is an exceptionally conscripted army. Most Israelis are conscripted to serve in the various branches of the IDF. As an exceptional army, the lessons to be learnt can serve as a model for integration and monitoring of ex-conscripted soldiers in Mozambique.

According to the South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (SACOD), militarism is defined as the notion where a country maintains a strong military capability for the defence or promotion of its national interests. The Oxford Advanced Learners’ Dictionary of Current English (OALDCE), defines it as the belief that a country should have great military strength in order to be powerful (OALDCE 2007, p. 968). On the other hand, Enloe (2000) defines militarisation as a process by which a person or a thing gradually comes to be controlled by

the military *or* comes to depend on it for its well-being (Enloe, 2000; as cited in Yaganoglu, 2006, p. 28). The difference between militarisation and militarism is that militarisation is a process by which military capabilities are introduced and/or enhanced in some social realm (Kinsella, 2013). The process consists of activities and preparations such as weapons procurement, conscription, and base construction, which take place within a society –As a result the government presumably becomes better equipped to take military action against foreign or domestic enemies. Kinsella observes that militarisation is used to suggest an implicit or explicit distribution of power with the military taking a leading position within the society compared to non-military sectors, (ibid). Thus, in power politics, fighting an insurgency has the tendency of placing state power in the hands of the military.

In contrast, Kinsella (2013) states that militarism is commonly used to describe a tendency to employ military over non-military means of conflict resolution. Thus, domestic and/or foreign policy orientations and choices are characterised as ‘militaristic’, which usually entails a judgement that policy makers are too quick to turn to military solutions or seek out opportunities to deploy armed force”, Kinsella (2013, p.105). This aspect will not be explored for Mozambique as our focus is on unintended outcomes of conscription.

According to Skjelsbaek (1979), from a sociological treatment, bravery, discipline, and loyalty, as well as authoritarianism can be summed as ‘militarism of the mind’ and somehow militarism policy values the military virtues in the society (as cited in Kinsella 2013, p. 105). This suggests that all countries that have powerful militaries have an element of militarism, and such generalities cannot help us understand particular countries such as Mozambique whose militarism is an unintended consequence. According to Morgenthau (2006, pp.173-174), excessive militarism fails to understand the paradox that maximum material power does not necessarily mean a maximum overall national power in the sense that if a state gives more emphasis on the military, throwing itself into the scale of international politics, such estate will find itself confronted by other states. In that sense the efforts will be equal or surpass its power. The result of militarism is superior military equipment but enemies everywhere instead of friendly nations. These are the realities confronting Israel.

Similarly, Lutz and Regan (2006) suggest that *militarism* identifies “a society’s emphasis on martial values [cults of action, courage, sacrifice, hard-body discipline and physical fitness]...while *militarisation* draws attention to the simultaneously material and discursive

nature of military dominance,” (Lutz and Regan as cited in Morris, 2006, p. 270). Lutz and Regan’s suggestion is explained by Morris according to whom militarisation can be understood to be:

... the collective mobilization of the personnel, ideologies, and resources, the regulation of bodies, minds and structures, necessary for war preparation, initiation, waging, occupation and reconstruction. The risks, costs and consequences resulting from, the material and ideological mobilizations in support of, and the purposes for, militarism and militarization, are internal and external, moral and political, emotional and psychological, domestic and international Morris, (2006, p. 270).

Israeli nationals and immigrants are subjected to military conscription under various and specific conditions. The duration of the conscription in the IDF differs in relation to gender, academic qualification and religious orientation. For example, males commonly serve for three years and females for two years. After that, both male and female conscripts may choose to discharge or to follow a military career.

The IDF has a division responsible for assisting ex-conscripts once they are integrated back into the society. This division is called Guidance Division and Fund for Discharged Soldiers and its function is to aid ex-conscripts during their first five years following release from either the obligatory or career army (Woolf, et al 2016, p.44). The Division also offers information on available courses and job opportunities throughout Israel, and is responsible for a programme to enable ex-conscripts to complete their studies (Woolf, L., et. al, 2016, p.44). It also promotes the rights of ex-conscripts, their study opportunities, professional and industrial training. In terms of integrating ex-conscripts in the society, the IDF provides various grants such as financial grant, personal deposit account, and unemployment compensation to keep ex-conscripts away from wrong doing. Israel ex-conscripts have financial grants which help their integration into civilian life. These benefits are prescribed in the Discharged Soldier’s section of the Israel Law of Military Service, 7<sup>th</sup> Edition. Under this law, every discharged soldier is entitled to financial integration assistance for specific purposes, namely acquiring housing, obtaining higher education or vocational training, establishing a business or getting married. Furthermore, these benefits include a demobilization grant and a personal deposit account. The benefits are calculated according to the duration one has served in the compulsory service. Each day of service is counted but, there is an exception for unavoidable periods of conscription as defined by law. The

maximum length of service that is taken into account when calculating the period of rights is 36 months (3 years) for males and 24 (2 years) for females (Woolf, L., et. al, 2016, p.44).

According to Woolf, L., et. al (2016) “A man or woman who accumulates 12 full months of regular compulsory service is eligible for the Demobilization Grant (*Ma’anak Shichrur*<sup>2</sup>). The amount is based on the length and type of service, and is transferred directly to the recipient’s bank account within 20-60 days of demobilization” (p.44). This grant is not for specific purposes for there is no indication regarding how to use the money given under this grant. As for the ***Personal Deposit Account*** the recipient does not receive the personal deposit directly into their bank account. The amount is meant for the following:

- ✓ Enabling ex-conscripts to complete high school, pursue academic studies, post-high-school yeshiva studies or professional training at a recognized institution.
- ✓ Purchasing an apartment, establish a business, or purchase into an established business.
- ✓ Getting married during or following military service
- ✓ Use the funds for driving lessons at some point.

This funding is usually provided for use within five years after service with a possible extension of two years.

In Israel, if ex-conscripts have worked in the “Essential Services” such as gas stations, construction, hotel work, agriculture and produce-packing- under some circumstances, certain industrial factories and plants and, nursing, for at least 6 months, they are entitled to a one-time grant according to the National Insurance Institute regulations, (p.48). Israel also has unemployment compensation. According to Woolf, L., et. al, (2016) “Discharged soldiers are entitled to unemployment compensation for a period of up to 70 days during the first year following demobilization, following the conclusion of half a year of employment. During their second year following discharge, discharged soldiers are entitled to up to 50 days of unemployment compensation if they work for 12 months out of the 18 preceding appearance at an office of the National Employment Service”, (p.49). These are some of the grants which ex-conscripts may benefit following their discharge. Various other benefits can be found in a booklet provided by Guidance Division.

---

<sup>2</sup> *Ma’anak Shichrur* means Demobilization Grant in Hebrew language

The monitoring of ex-conscripts in Israel is done under the reserve duty as prescribed by the Israel Defence Service Law of 1986. Chapter 4, Paragraph 27. (a) Israeli Law on conscription provides that “A person of military service found fit for service and not being on regular service shall belong to the reserve forces of the Israel Defence Forces and shall be liable to annual reserve service and monthly reserve service for the periods specified in this chapter”. It is within this provision that the Guidance Division draws its power to place every ex-conscript in the reserve duty. According to Woolf, L., et. al (2016), “Most soldiers are placed in a reserve unit following discharge from initial compulsory service” (p.52). Annually, whether the ex-soldier served in regular or conscripted army, the length to serve in reserve varies from 2 to 5 weeks. As most ex-conscripts are placed in the reserve duty, by default this can be said to be an effective way of monitoring them. Considering the fact that the IDF provides various grants to discharged soldiers and that “The age at which reserve soldiers are no longer required to serve varies according to position, rank, and other factors, and is determined exclusively by the I.D.F.” (p.52), the possibility of these ex-conscripts becoming a threat to the Israel would be of a very low degree. We now turn to look at conscription policy fits in the realism theory.

### **3.4. Realism Theory**

Realism is a theory which attempts to explain the relations between states in terms of power. It states are obsessed with maintaining their power as well as acquiring new power. Power is expressed at home as internal stability and economic expansion, and in the international arena as influence, both in terms of the ability to influence other states as well as the ability to become immune to the influence of others (Kumar as cited in Pradhan n.d.). According to Pradhan (n.d.), realists see the international system as a constant competition for power, with some states gaining power, while others finding their power reduced. According to Morgenthau (1904-1980), in the world of states, power is determined by geographical size, natural resources, economy, military, technological development and population. It also relates to imperceptible things such as national will and ideology. Even though military power is not the only thing attributed to power in the international world, it is the most important. It is in this manner that conscription should be understood, as a means of building the power of the state.

Kumar sums up political realism in three main principles being; [1] the quest to follow national interests, [2] profound desire by a state to expand its power over other states

and subdue them and [3] the ability for a state to continue using its power to influence any decision that supports and drives its interests, Kumar (n.d), (as cited in Pradhan n.d.). Donnelly (2005) also observes that realists emphasize the constraints on politics imposed by human selfishness, egoism, and lack of international government, “anarchy”.

Morgenthau adds that national interests are defined in terms of power. He states that “The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power” (Thomson & Clinton, 2005: p.5). This means that the desire for power and total control by a state characterises realists. State missions, according to this theory are in accordance with national interests. These interests often include some kind of survival instincts, security, economic prosperity, and influence over other states. Morgenthau (Thomson & Clinton, 2005 and Donnelly, 2005) also posits that realism underscores the fact that the meaning of interest is not fixed or unchanging. The international system is one of anarchy and only the powerful states survive. Political realism takes a self-motivated view of interest changes to suit the change in the environment. Similarly, the power of a nation also undergoes changes to secure national interest.

Therefore, power and security in realism are the main interconnected issues because the world is seen as a place of confrontations in the pursuit of national or international interests. As realists place more emphasis on power and security, states should always make sure that ex-conscripted soldiers do not pose a danger to security. This brings us to the blowback, a theory that explains how states can prevent unplanned results of (conscription) policies.

### **3.5. Blowback Theory**

Blowback is a theory that focuses on unplanned consequences of policies that were kept secret from the people of a country (Johnson 2000). The theory focuses on the need to prevent the discharge of disastrous secret policies which later bring harmful consequences to a given country, especially the uninformed populations (Johnson 2000 and Art 2014). With the Blowback Theory Johnson (2000) explains why the Americans are hated around the world, saying that this hatred is the unintended consequence of their policies.

The concept “blowback” means retaliation for things done by government to and in foreign countries. We want to extend it to unintended consequences of state policies within the

nation. In the case of America, Blowback also refers to retaliation for the numerous illegal operations that have been carried out abroad that were kept totally secret from the American public. This means that when the retaliation comes, the people are unable to put the events in context. So they tend to support acts intended to lash out against the perpetrators, thereby most commonly preparing the ground for yet another cycle of blowback violence. Johnson tries to provide some historical background for understanding the dilemmas America as a nation confronts today, although the focus is more on Asia, Johnson (2000). In our case, we seek to assess whether the Mozambican policies of military conscription cannot have equally unintended consequences that could place the security of the country in danger. Our premise is that conscription could have the intended goal of securing the nation, but that it could also have the un-intended consequence of militarising the state and the society, both of which compromise national security.

Hegghammer (2010) assesses the argument that the 1980s Arab Afghan war was one of the unintended consequences of previous US state support which had given rise to the blowback activities. According to Hegghammer, the Arab Afghans (and by extension al-Qaida) were not a U.S.-Saudi creation that later turned against its patrons. Hegghammer separates support for the Afghan Mujahedeen that were supported by the Americans during the Soviet invasion, from foreign fighters who joined the war during that time. He observes that the foreign fighters were the products of Islamic International Organisations, and that they should not be viewed as a blowback against previous American support.

In contrast, Johnson's (2000) arguments are paradoxical; firstly, he criticised the US foreign policy which, in pursuit of its national interests in the world, especially in the wars against former Soviet Union in Afghanistan, trained and supported certain individuals, including "Bin Laden" and the Taliban militias, who later became security threats to the US. Second, Johnson (2000) criticises American foreign policy for generating enormous unintended consequences. This is what we want to demonstrate with Mozambican policy on conscription, that the improper implementation of a conscription policy can have unintended 'blowback' consequences that pose a threat to the security of the country. Explaining unintended consequences could help states appreciate that official goals are not the only outcomes of policies; there are unintended outcomes that could cost the nation. While the policies of conscription in Mozambique are not secret policies, only official goals are known, and the dangers from their unintended outcomes remain hidden. It is our goal to alert the

Government of Mozambique and its people to the possible negative consequences of the conscription policies. Our argument is that one of the unintended outcomes of conscription is the militarisation of the state and society, which in turn can change the political culture of the society.

Internally, a state underpins its security primarily on its legitimacy and secondly on its military and police. But where political legitimacy is weak, particularly where there is an armed insurgency, a state pins all its security on the military, including on expanded conscription schemes. Thus, militarisation can come as an unintended consequence of unstable politics and this is not healthy for any country. There is no doubt that being militarily powerful is not the official goal of the Mozambican state. It is a state finding itself in-circled in internal violence from an insurgency that has proved difficult to deal with and that has failed to transform itself into a normal political party that could participate in normal politics which is peaceful and democratic. It is natural that a state engulfed by violent insurgencies tends to rely heavily on the military, thus enhancing the status of the military in the whole state system.

It has been mentioned above that Israel enjoyed the benefits of realism theory because it provided best social wellbeing to its ex-conscripts.

### **3.6. Methods of Data Collection and Analysis**

This study was based on secondary sources of information. It relied on documents provided by officials in the ministry of defence and from the defence headquarters. It included journals and newspapers articles, decree laws, books and online electronic sources.

The study was generally guided by interpretive perspective or qualitative approach. According to Neumann (2006) the research in interpretative approach aims to understand the social meaning in context. The interpretive framework aims to capture the lives of the participants in order to understand and to interpret the meaning, Henning (2004). Interpretive theory of knowledge is founded on observable phenomena, as well as descriptions of intentions, beliefs, values and rationales, as well as meaning making and self-understanding (Henning, 2004).

Data was analysed basing on the outlined themes developed in the methodology. As conscription in Mozambique was started by the Portuguese in their attempts to fight the local

traditional leaders, particularly at the time when nationalist movements had emerged and throughout the wars for the national liberation, the research took a historical approach.

### **3.7. *Ethical Consideration***

The study has adhered to the principles of social research by being objective, so that the findings are not emotional or personal ideologies. Objectivity is achieved by circumventing bias. Because the study is based on secondary sources the interpretative side of the study is less exposed to bias. Adhering to the principles of ethical research, plagiarism was deterred by acknowledging all the sources.

### **3.8. *Limitations of the Study***

The study used secondary sources, and that is a limitation by itself. We tried interviews but the sensitive nature of national security meant that interviewees were not free to provide accurate information regarding the numbers of conscripted and discharged soldiers on an annual basis. Interviewees also refused to tell the researcher how many ex-conscripts were absorbed by what institutions. Finally, the main constraint was the fact that a key institution (the police) did not allow the data collection regarding the involvement of ex-conscripts in crimes or violence. The police refused to be interviewed, and this left a disconnection between ex-conscripts and their involvement in crimes. Thus, this research could not concretely link the activities of RENAMO and the high levels of violent crimes with ex-conscripts. The police advised that the research be abandoned. For these reasons, any primary data collected through interviews has been discarded.

## CHAPTER 4 – THE BENEFITS OF MILITARY CONSCRIPTION

### 4.1. Introduction

Military conscription is an important policy that contributes to securing a nation or a state. It is through a conscription policy that some nations were or are able to resource their armed forces. In Mozambique both the colonial and Frelimo regimes employed it positively to boost their fighting power. This chapter examines benefits of military conscription in an historic perspective. First it looks at colonial regime conscription and then at conscription in the post-colonial period.

### 4.2. Benefits of Military Conscription in the Colonial Period

Initially, Portugal introduced conscription not only to fight the African chiefs, but also to Africanise the war in its territories in Africa. Such conscription was linked to the Portuguese colonial occupation of Africa in countries such as Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. With regard to conscription, the Portuguese regime initially conscripted the Portuguese nationals and, later it also conscripted Africans to incorporate them in the army. According to Coelho (2002, p.130) Portuguese conscription centred on a strategy according to which there was a need to *Africanise* the war efforts to enhance the legitimacy of the Portuguese system.

Such a strategy came about in 1845, when Brazil ceased to import slaves from Africa and Portugal had to administer African territories. In the case of Mozambique, the decline of mercantile dynamics was replaced by new ones which came to manage the labour force for the export of local goods. At this moment Portugal started to establish the administrative structure from the top to the bottom (Coelho, 2002). The establishment of the new administrative structures demanded territorial control since the local traditional authority demonstrated resistance to the Portuguese establishment. (Coelho, 2002, p.132) affirms that:

In view of the serious problems Portugal had to face from the very beginnings of her presence in Africa, particularly the long distances from Lisbon and the shortage of men, conquest was achieved to a large extent through the use of local forces, complemented by the dispatch of expeditionary troops from Lisbon and India whenever the situation was deemed serious.

Thus, conscription aided Portugal to build a large force to break the African resistance, to prevail over and take control of the African communities, and to put them into economic production.

The military presence of Portugal in Mozambique was initially felt mostly along the coast as it happened in all its colonies. The focus was the systematic introduction of Africans in the Portuguese armed forces like in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and, especially in Mozambique. The process enveloped the ideological discourse of multi-culturalism and the preservation of the Portuguese empire (Coelho, 2003). The early conscription was characterised by the engagement of African soldiers in many forms which included marginal roles such as servants, informants to more important ones in combat units. For the Africans to serve in the Portuguese Army they were initially conscripted systematically and arbitrarily, reflecting how other public servants were recruited to undertake the plantation works as Portuguese authority was being extended. Conscription was facilitated by the population census as the decree of 14 November 1901, in its article 61, set that the colonies should have their own recruitment regulations (Coelho, 2002, p.133). Coelho further indicates that local kings had to undertake conscription which was stipulated in the 1904 regulation whereby as gratification the kings would receive grants for each recruited African man. According to (Coelho, 2002, p.133) it was in 1904 that;

... The Portuguese officially introduced a regulation which stipulated that recruitment should be undertaken with the local *régulo*<sup>3</sup> as intermediary, who would receive a gratification for each man recruited. In 1906 a more aggressive recruitment scheme based on the use of agents was implemented, using, as Azambuja Martins eloquently writes, “the same methods used for recruiting labour for the mines in Transvaal.” In the face of the decreasing resistance of locals to military service, the 1914 regulation prescribed the creation of a military reserve, which permitted the engagement of 25,000 Africans, or 44 percent of the total force, in the struggle against the German invasion of Northern Mozambique during the First World War.

Africans were conscripted to serve in the Portuguese armed forces since the Portuguese authorities saw it as a way of “nationalising” the African population of its colonial territories. As the demand for manpower for the army increased, later in 1933, a new conscription regulation was introduced and every African was expected to serve in distinct service branches while the non-indigenous Africans served in same branches together with the white Portuguese born in the colonies. They had to be registered in the ranks under Portuguese Christian names to civilise. By the end of the Portuguese colonial war, in 1974, these soldiers represented almost half of all operational colonial troops (Coelho, 2002, pp.132-134).

---

<sup>3</sup> Chief of indigenous people or a small African state/kingdom

Coelho (2002, p.177) provides a clear description of how the conscription process unfolded. Conscription in Mozambique by the Portuguese colonial regime took place at three levels. According to (Coelho, 2003, p.177) the three levels of the militarisation of the society were integrated in the following forms of recruitment: the *universal military conscription* responsible for sourcing the regular Portuguese armed forces, *the process of general militarisation* and, *the specific militarisation*.

#### **4.2.1. Universal Military Conscription**

Universal military conscription was the normal recruitment of citizens to source the Portuguese armed forces either in Europe or in African colonial territories as discussed above. For the period prior to the wars conducted by the nationalist movements for the liberation of the territories occupied by Portugal in Africa, the focus was on the two subsequent levels, general and specific militarisation.

#### **4.2.2. General Militarisation**

In the process of *general militarisation* the colonial strategy considered all Africans as potential ‘terrorists’ due to the emergence of the nationalist movement. In order to counter such an eventuality, the strategy was to conquer Africans and compromise them to support the defence of the colonial order and prevent them from joining or supporting the nationalist movements in their respective territories (Coelho, 2003). The *ideological vision* of the strategy was the *imperial myth* with its unique territorial dimensions from Minho to Timor in which everyone was taken to be a Portuguese citizen regardless of his/her origin or race. Its basic idea was that one would have the Portuguese status if he/she lived in the Portuguese colonial territories and had acquired the colonial culture through education or participation in the armed forces. In this case all Africans in the colonies would acquire Portuguese citizenship through assimilation (Coelho, 2003, pp.178-179).

From the views of *general militarisation* allied to the military teachings from the West on counter-subversion, the colonial regime developed and strengthened the conviction that, ‘*one would win the war if the population is on his/her side*’. From this principle the Portuguese regime installed the structures for the psycho-social actions which would transform the peasants into active defenders of the colonial order and active combatants against the armed nationalist movements (Coelho, 2003, p.178). In the same way the regime used the philosophy of assimilation to create para-military units with the view of organising

the populations in the traditional villages and into arming them for self-defence. For example, in some northern districts of Mozambique and other places, by 1960, such psycho-social and para-military operations succeeded because there were great numbers of armed populations in the traditional villages and these were even capable of locating and deterring the nationalist combatants.

The populations were grouped in Communal villages. Such groupings, like in Angola and Guinea-Bissau though with different designations, was fortified and controlled by authorities and located in the war areas where the nationalist combatants were likely to penetrate or break into (Coelho, 2003, pp.178-179). The defence or para-military practice of the Portuguese regime in the communal villages came to be granted not only by the militias recruited (conscripted) locally, trained and armed for the defence of communal villages as it happened in the traditional villages, but also by a reinforcement of a European policy officer, who monitored these forces (Coelho, 2003).

#### **4.2.3. Benefits of Conscripting Africans in the Portuguese Army**

Other benefits that served not only the colonial regime but also the Africans were the conscription under the specification militarisation policy. In response to the difficulties that Portugal was facing in recruiting European Portuguese citizens to fight in African territories, recruitment of Africans was intensified. Some scholars argue that the local recruitment for the regular Portuguese armed forces derived from the financial difficulties that Portugal had in funding the war and the metropolitan recruitment that had surpassed its capacity. For others, local conscription had to respond to the modern theories of *counter-insurrection* on the French *jaunissement* in Indo-China or according to the British theory of the *same element* in Malaysia which emphasised the advantages of local recruitment (Coelho, 2003, p.182). African Mozambican soldiers constituted alternative sources of recruitment, it was cheaper (compared to the metropolitan recruitment which needed intercontinental sea or air transport to Mozambique), and strategic (African soldiers were in an advantaged position with regard to ground adaptability for being natives or possessing local cultures). According to (Coelho, 2002, p.147) the Portuguese Chief-of-Staff considered that the;

African troops were more efficient, more cost-effective, cheaper and susceptible of delivering better results not only in military terms, but also politically. Moreover, if properly organised in militarised villages they could fight forever.

(Portuguese Chief-of-Staff)

The African soldiers were better positioned in terms of convincing the local populations to provide information on the guerrillas. They could resist the tropical diseases, and their death would not impact much on the metropolitan public opinions on the effects of the war. Additionally, the African soldiers had the advantages of belonging to the same race of the nationalist guerrillas, thus compromising the legitimacy of the latter.

In 1973, changes occurred. Special Groups of Parachutists and other Special Groups were introduced in the central regions of Mozambique. According to (Chachiua, 1999), reinforcement of human resources capabilities was the result of an increase of FRELIMO's combat activities in 1970 which made the colonial regime to reinforce Kaúlza de Arriaga, a Portuguese General and Commander of the Portuguese Army in Mozambique with a force of 35, 000 men for the notorious Gordian Knot Operation to counter the revolutionary guerrillas in the country. Further, Chachiua expounds that "At the beginning of 1974 there were about 60,000 Portuguese troops stationed in Mozambique and three months later, a further 10, 000 were sent in from Angola" (Chachiua, 1999). From the above numbers we observe that by independence the Portuguese army had an approximate total number of more than 70,000 soldiers in the Mozambican soil. Volunteers were recruited and operated in their home areas, in coordination with, and in some instances under the control of the military (Coelho, 2002, p.145).

#### **4.3. Benefits of Military Conscription during the Struggle for the Independence**

Conscription was also used in a beneficiary way by FRELIMO during the liberation war. FRELIMO was founded on the need to fight against the Portuguese colonial regime and to maintain the security of liberated zones as well as to attain state power. It should be noted that, conscription by FRELIMO then was not based on law. Nationals were either compulsorily recruited or they volunteered and were integrated into the guerrilla movement. By 1970 FRELIMO was reported to have around 20,000 guerrillas trained in countries where it had support, such as Algeria, Tanzania, Cuba, China and Yugoslavia. Among the 20,000 guerrillas, 10,000 were said to be armed while the remaining 10,000 had no armaments. Thus, conscription resourced FRELIMO's fighting power even though armaments were in short supply. Later, FRELIMO was also able to arm the population to defend the 'Liberated Zones. According to FRELIMO's magazine, "*Voz da Revolução*<sup>4</sup>", the 5<sup>th</sup> Session of Frelimo Central Committee indicated that "... during the liberation struggle the population was

---

<sup>4</sup> "*Voz da Revolução*" was FRELIMO Party newsletter, an Official Organ of information

organised as popular militia to guarantee, at large, the defence of the villages and ‘machambas’<sup>5</sup>” (Voz de Revolução No.67 of 1979, p.26). Conscription during this period, besides the defence of the Liberated Areas and strengthening the fighting capabilities in human resources, aided FRELIMO to achieve its main goal, to defeat the colonial regime and to assume state power.

#### **4.4. Benefits of Military Conscription after Independence**

As the new government of FRELIMO was taking over the power from the Portuguese colonial regime, it did experience shortage of trusted staff to fill the various governmental posts. The formation of the police for an example, like most other government institutions where FRELIMO had to form the institutions with individuals who took part in the struggle, the conscripts from the struggle served to fill in the positions since the new government even had to rely on members from the colonial police - known as Policia de Segurança Pública (PSP), (Tsucana, L., et al. 2005, p.2 and, Jornal do Governo of 15<sup>th</sup> May 2013, p.1). The filling in of the first police positions post-independence was through the use of conscripted soldiers from liberation war who had to serve in the police easing the government’s task of having to recruit and train new personnel.

#### **4.5. Benefits of Military Conscription During the Civil-War Period**

Conscription was also used beneficiary during the civil war. After independence the FRELIMO’s Government faced an insurgency supported by the then Rhodesian regime of Smith and later by the South African regime, both of which committed atrocities against the new independent state of Mozambique and its people. In response to the raids and to RENAMO’s activities, there was a need to use conscription. According to (Chachiua, 1999) “Machel was forced ... to increase the army from the alleged 1975 level of 10 000 men to 21 200 troops within three years”. Conscription played its role in the 80’s as RENAMO pressed more military operations in the country. RENAMO’s pressure, again, led the government to rethink and re-plan its strategies to counter this. The then government of FRELIMO through considerable conscription initiatives created three regional commands responsible for the recruitment of people to integrate the FAM/FPLM (Chachiua, 1999).

---

<sup>5</sup> Machambas is Mozambican Portuguese that refers to agricultural cultivated areas (peasant farms). As FRELIMO liberated some areas the guerrillas had to farm for their subsistence

#### **4.6. Conclusion**

The chapter has shown that conscription had benefits for the Portuguese colonial system, for FRELIMO during the liberation war, and for the FRELIMO government immediately after independence. On the Portuguese side conscription benefited Portugal to subjugate Mozambique and to maintain it throughout the period it dominated the country. But conscription also benefited those who went through it as it boosted their wellbeing because they had to attend school and achieved better standards of civilisation.

We also learnt that Frelimo relied on conscription during the liberation war and during the civil-war to resource the FAM/FPLM to fight the insurgency that was led from outside. But we also want to argue that poor handling of conscription created dangers that threatened the stability of the state, leading to internal instabilities in forms of armed gangs, insurgencies and so on.

## **CHAPTER 5 – THE SECURITY COSTS OF MILITARY CONSCRIPTION**

### **5.1. Introduction**

Military conscription also has negative security implications. This chapter focuses on the unintended consequences of military conscriptions to the Mozambican state and nation.

### **5.2. The Costs of Military Conscription before and after the Independence**

The Portuguese regime recruited and trained militias and deployed them in the communal villages where they harassed and intimidated the population. The Portuguese colonial government intentionally loosened control over its African militias, leading to violence against the residents. They committed various atrocities that included the pillage of food stocks, beverage and raped women (Coelho, 2003, pp.175-193).

In addition, the level of militarisation of these individuals came to trigger the later civil-war violence that followed independence (Coelho, 2003, p.177). Africans who had been conscripted into the Portuguese Army went on to form the rebel movement. Conscripted African soldiers who fought the liberation war on the Portuguese side were not integrated after the attainment of independence. This externally-sponsored insurgence operated as the National Resistance of Movement – MNR – which fought for the Rhodesia, as well as for its own inclusion in the Mozambican society. Later, this group gained political status and became a political party named RENAMO. The status of a political party took place after the collapse of the Smith regime in Zimbabwe and the Apartheid regime in SA. It was because of these events that military conscription was founded, out of the need to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent Mozambique.

In order to understand the origin and development of the insurgent movement, Malache, et al (2005) in their article ‘Profound transformations and regional conflagrations: The history of Mozambique’s armed forces from 1975–2005’ provide three developments that led to the deterioration of security in the region. The first development is that as the FRELIMO guerrilla forces crossed the Zambezi River into Mozambique in the early 1970s (...) Rhodesia and South Africa shifted their border strategically down to the Limpopo River since these rivers constituted natural barriers against the spread of Frelimo’s nationalist war. FRELIMO’s movements had also negatively impacted the economy of Rhodesia because the Beira Corridor had severely suffered damages resulting from guerrilla activities. This fact was associated with the Zimbabwean nationalists’ initial phase of the warfare against the

Rhodesian regime, which threatened both the white minority regime and the farmers in areas bordering Mozambique. Secondly, the April 1974 coup in Portugal worried both Rhodesian and South African regimes in the worsening security situation. According to Malache et al. (2005), these regimes feared that the new Portuguese political situation and the FRELIMO's militant posture in Mozambique could endanger the survivability of their own regimes. Thirdly, Portugal was providing a way to the effective independences of Angola and Mozambique in the Lusaka Agreement of 7 September 1974, and this was interpreted by the Rhodesian and South African regimes as encirclement of their regimes. Lastly, internal resistance in Rhodesia and South Africa was establishing bases in Mozambique and these had to be destabilised. As a matter of fact, FRELIMO supported the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. Chachiua (1999) asserted that:

... the Ian Smith regime used a new impetus of the old diplomatic and military support for Robert Mugabe's ZANLA (Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army), coupled with the 1976 trade embargo to and from Rhodesia, to justify both raids into Mozambican territory and the lending of support to the emerging *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (National Resistance of Mozambique - RENAMO).

There is no doubt that RENAMO was constituted by those ex-conscripts that Portugal had abandoned and that the new Mozambique was unwilling to integrate. According to Macaringue (2005), they amounted to 30,000 individuals. Macaringue posits that;

(...) the records show that during the negotiations, the Portuguese delegation proposed that all Mozambicans within the colonial army should be integrated into the new post-independence army. Frelimo rejected the proposal on grounds that they were part of the colonial machinery which had to be dismantled.

These individuals were also socially excluded and politically intimidated by the then government of FRELIMO – they were sent to assemble in 're-education centres' or prisons (Coelho, 2002). According to Chachiua (1999), they were considered by FRELIMO leadership as the agents of colonialism and were sent home without any plans for their social or economic reintegration. They became useless in the new independent society because they were not only rejected and left unemployed, but the government of FRELIMO intended to punish and purify (ideological re-orientation) these individuals. Because these individuals had participated in joint Portuguese-Rhodesian operations against FRELIMO, they feared for their lives, so they fled to Rhodesia from where they fought against the new Mozambican

government (Malache, et. al., 2005, p.163). These individuals constituted the first MNR which later formed the RENAMO movement that fought the government in all fronts until the end of the 16 years' civil war in the 1990's. As a blowback or a cost of military conscription, some of them, if not most, took part in Rhodesian operations against the FRELIMO government during the liberation war and after. Then, they joined the Rhodesian army and fought not only the Zimbabwean nationalist guerrillas in Mozambique, but also formed the guerrillas of the MNR, (Malache, A. et. al., 2005, p.163). In the same spirit and in 1982, RENAMO practised a non-formal military conscription. Such conscription, forcefully practised without any laws, militarised the society by dispersing its 8,000 guerrillas all over the country. Through the already established military conscription of 1978, the government further conscripted more citizens by creating ten provincial commands which were also responsible for the recruitment of soldiers to serve at the district and local levels if it was necessary (Chachiua, 1999).

A further cost of conscription was the ill integration of the FRELIMO guerrilla forces that participated in the war for the national independence. In relation to the issue of non-integration and non-demobilisation of these individuals, (Chachiua, 1999) posited that;

The so-called 'liberation war veterans' were never officially demobilised, although some had to leave the barracks. In general, they were not encouraged to return to their places of origin, but were quartered in rural or suburban districts, most of them retaining their weapons. In line with this, an undocumented reintegration support scheme was undertaken to allow their socio-economic integration (Chachiua, 1999).

Thus, the 10,000 un-armed or poorly armed FRELIMO guerrillas who were abandoned by their liberation organisation, found themselves stranded. They acknowledged themselves as having participated in the struggle for the liberation of the land and the man. Wiegink citing Ranqueni, a former combatant, shows that this group differs from other groups of combatants.

They [the government/FRELIMO] know that we have been fighting for the people of this land. We were fighting for the liberation of men and land. It is very different from this war that stopped just now. It even has a different name, how is it again? The destabilization war (Wiegink, 2013, p.51)

So, Mozambique did not have the capacity or willingness to absorb all its former fighters. Instead, it dumped them in the society without any resources to survive civilian life.

Mozambique received two types of ex-combatants but did not have capacity to absorb them: the African ex-conscripted combatants who fought in the Portuguese army and the veteran FRELIMO guerrillas who could not be absorbed into the new state army. Only after the civil war did the government create a department that was responsible for ex-FRELIMO combatants who were cared for by the government and had specific status ‘in the hands of the government’. They were now considered as having liberated the country from the colonial regime (Wiegink, 2013, p.51).

### **5.2.1. Militarisation of the Public Services**

Recruitment into the public service in Mozambique was based on military experience rather than on proper training and skills required for the running of government bureaucratic institutions. The Mozambican public service was dominated by senior military officers, and not by trained bureaucrats. Most government political leaders were also former combatants. “The transitional Government faced many complex and colossal difficulties in a moment that the population of the country had illiteracy rate of 93 per cent besides that there was a generalised lack of trained Mozambican staff at all levels”<sup>6</sup>, (Jornal Notícia Online, 30 de Junho de 2015). From 1979 to 1989, even the judicial system was led by ex-combatants. The judiciary was placed under the Ministry of the National Defence (MND) in the mono-party system of the governance (Mozambique History Net (MHN)). From MHN records the judicial system was a military institution. The records indicate that:

*The Tribunal Militar Revolucionário (TMR or Revolutionary Military Court) was an interim structure established on 29 March 1979 by Decreto-Lei 3/79 of the Comissão Permanente of the Assembleia Popular. On 1 April 1979, the ‘Ministério de Defesa’ announced the appointment of a [General] as the presiding judge (...) and four senior military officers as judges. New panels of judges were appointed at least twice, in March 1981 and September 1982. The main function of the TMR was to try cases of offences against the security of the state, and it had the power to pass the death sentence. (<http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/tmr.php>)*

By subsuming the judiciary under defence, Mozambique failed to establish proper courts of law, with properly trained judges and lawyers.

---

<sup>6</sup> Jornal Noticias Online: Author’s translation from the original text “O GOVERNO de Transição confrontou-se com problemas complexos e ciclópicos, numa altura em que o analfabetismo atingia 93% da população, para além da falta generalizada de quadros moçambicanos a todos os níveis”.

Another instance of public service militarisation that worked against good governance was the structure of government from 1975 to the 1980s. Frelimo established state-party structures such as the group organisers (Grupo Dinamizadores) at all levels from the villages to cities. These forms of government later introduced the party cells, circles, zones and districts, each of which had a party secretary as the leading representative. Following the Portuguese system of administrative hierarchy, FRELIMO introduced district and administrative posts. In the later 1980s FRELIMO introduced further division and appointments (Alexander, 1997, pp.2-3). The party and state structures came together to militarise the state institutions as a matter of practice because the appointed individuals had to be military personnel. As Alexander (1997, p.3) points out:

Party and state were at every level closely linked: the highest-ranking administrative official at district and post level was also the first secretary of Frelimo, and president of the assembly; the provincial governor sat as president of the provincial assembly and was the ranking party official in the province. Party leaders prepared the lists from which assembly deputies were nominated; directors of state enterprises and farms, provincial Ministry representatives and military commanders were almost always party leaders as well as deputies of assemblies.

Militarising the governing structures was partly inherited from military ethos acquired in the war for the liberation of the country. These leaders including the then president of Mozambique, for example, started their political careers as military commanders which made the then FRELIMO leaders to bring experiences of the military from liberated zones to the newly post independent government (Alexander, 1997, p.3). Alexander also observes that:

After independence the experience of the liberated zones in the north of the country was a much cited model for transformation, and a military vocabulary ('campaigns', 'offensives', 'enemies', etc.) pervaded official discourse. The military legacy was, however, much more than simply discursive (Alexander 1997, p.3).

The process of militarising the public institutions in that period was the direct consequence of recruitment or conscription intended to counter the war situation of that moment.

### **5.3. The Costs of Military Conscription during the Civil-War**

The militarisation of the police during the civil war was a tactical move to help contain the insurgency. The police force had to be recruited and trained in military tactics in order to

enable it to cope with the politico-military situation of the civil war. The participation of the police in the civil war has been illustrated by (Dissel & Frank, 2012).

During the civil war, the PRM were unable to operate in a number of parts of the country and, in places where they did have a presence, they participated in armed conflict on behalf of the government (Dissel & Frank, 2012, p.77).

The post-independence civil war forced the FRELIMO government to recruit and train the police with military tactics and techniques, and to equip them to cope with the war situations. A speech by the current president in a graduation ceremony of the regular and special police forces insinuate that the police should replace the old guard and replace them with new people. According to a state newspaper, “Notícias online”, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence and Security and, the President of the Republic of Mozambique urged Police Officers holding high ranks to abide to the system’s reform in place regarding their retirement in order to give opportunities to the newly trained personnel to render their duty to the nation. The president argued:

Let us be courageous to reform the system in order to allow it to be manageable and functional. One who has served and has enough years in the house, with a green leaf, deserves and has the right to rest, to reserve, to retire, and have pension (Jornal Notícias online, 11<sup>th</sup> July 2015)<sup>7</sup>

Surprisingly, ex-convicts were not mentioned even though they are natural candidates to boost the capacity of the police force.

As civil war intensified, desertions were suffered by both government and rebel forces. It is possible that deserters got sucked into the criminal world and violent crimes. In addition, the government armed the general population (Chachiua, 1999), thus plunging the country into security crises. The following figures by Chachiua illustrate the militarisation of the society:

- i. 40 per cent of the population in Sofala province carried arms;
- ii. In Beira, the second major city in Mozambique and the capital province of Sofala and where RENAMO had its strongholds, the government conscripted and trained and armed approximately 30,000 militia;

---

<sup>7</sup> Author’s translation of (Jornal Notícias online 11<sup>th</sup> July 2015) article

- iii. The government distributed about 1,5 million assault rifles to the civilians for self-defence during the civil war;
- iv. By the end of the civil war estimates by the Organisation of the United Nation for Mozambique (ONUMOZ) indicate that there were about 155, 600 armed men in the country

These figures illustrate that the growing insecurity caused by RENAMO led the government to further utilise the 1978 law of military conscription. As security problems grew, the government provided unspecified number of guns to militias and to the civilian populations for the protection of cities, suburbs, villages, districts, state owned companies (Chachiuva, 1999) and schools. This indiscriminate distribution of weapons led to endless armed violence and insecurity in Mozambique.

District administrators had been given more than four weapons each, and these included AK-47s and pistols which were not often registered by the military authorities. Chachiuva observes that those who received the weapons handled them carelessly and some weapons got lost or misplaced. A former army officer admitted that the motivation behind arms distribution had been political because:

The military was not even consulted and, of course, it did not have in mind the need for arms control. From a military point of view the distribution of weapons to [the] civilian population was nonsense. Even to militia groups it should have been more cautious. Because, those arms could - and most of the time they did - end up reinforcing the enemy. But the political leadership dimmed it correct! (Chachiuva, 1999)

Instead of the arms being used for security, they ended up in RENAMO 's hands which used them against the politicians and the civilians.

Although the age limit was provided by the law of military conscription, the government compulsorily recruited young people below the prescribed age to serve in the national army. RENAMO too recruited children. Such practises prevented a generation of youths from attending school. A study by Honwana (1999) on children participation in civil-wars in Angola and Mozambique illustrates the use of child soldiers. Honwana's study revealed that guerrilla forces in Mozambique had a higher number of child soldiers than in Angola. According to Honwana's estimates more than 9,000 children served in UNITA and between 8,000 and 10,000 in RENAMO. In the same study, both the Angolan and

Mozambican armies used children. Children were used to “carry weapons and other equipment on the front lines, in reconnaissance missions, in mining, in espionage, and so forth” (Honwana, 1999)<sup>8</sup>.

The idea behind conscripting child soldiers was that “children are easier to control and manipulate, are also easily programmed to feel little fear or revulsion for their actions and are easily programmed to think of war and only war” (Honwana, 1999). Reports about Mozambican child soldiers indicate that children under 18 years took part in the 16 years armed conflict playing different roles such as messengers, porters, spies, and cooks and even participated in combat as warriors. According to Aird, Efraime, Boia & Errante (2001), “Among them, 1.5 percent were girls of all demobilised combatants and, at the 19 RENAMO bases to which the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance gained access in 1994, 40 percent of the 2000 children found at these sites were girls” (Aird, S. et. al. 2001). According to Honwana, “Children were taken from school, from their homes, and from the street directly to military camps for training. Many were kidnapped during military attacks on villages as well as in road ambushes. Many children also joined the army (both the government and the rebel) for protection, food, opportunities to loot and a sense of power with a gun in their hands” (Honwana, 1999).

In certain areas of Mozambique many youths became attracted to RENAMO, especially due to the crisis in the countryside. Many youths migrated from town and returned to rural areas unable to find work. In 1984, “Operação Produção” returned to the countryside those considered “unproductive”. These returnees could no longer fit in with local structures and into the unattractive life in rural areas. To these youths, RENAMO offered a different purpose in life by putting a gun in their hands.

Conscription for the armed forces of Mozambique as well as the training and arming of the population by the government and militias together with the RENAMO’s training and arming the populations and *majubas*<sup>9</sup> during the civil war led to the spread of small arms all over the Mozambican society Chachiua (1999).

In summary, conscription in the colonial and post-colonial periods and during the civil war led to militarisation of state institutions, to widespread violence against the civilians. It

---

<sup>8</sup> Honwana, A. (1999). "Negotiating post-war identities: child soldiers in Mozambique and Angola." *Codesria Bulletin* 1(2): 4-13.

<sup>9</sup> The name that referring to Renamo’s militia force during the civil war in Mozambique

resulted in the use of child soldiers, to insecurity and a protracted civil war. All these constitute security costs on the Mozambican society.

#### **5.4. The Costs of Poor Demobilisation after the Civil War**

This section analyses the costs of poor demobilisation in the period that followed the civil war.

##### **5.4.1. Inaccurate DDR Post-Civil War**

Both RENAMO and FRELIMO had to provide numbers of their military personnel to be disarmed, demobilised and reintegrated into the society following the UN mandates on the DDR program. According to Ostheimer (2001) 92,881 ex-combatants had to be demobilised and re-integrated into the society. The end of the civil war brought to the country more groups of ex-soldiers with different statuses. According to (Wiegink, 2013, p.54),

... the civil war was an awkward war, ending not in a victory, but in an uneasy peace. It resulted in two “types” of veterans: *first*, Renamo’s veterans, who were not (explicitly) considered by the FRELIMO government in post-war policy making. Even though RENAMO was accepted as a political party, its military past was deemed illegal by the FRELIMO government, as were its fighters (...). Government army veterans - FAM make up the other “type”. The government’s position toward this group is, however, more ambivalent for various reasons. There are several practical reasons for these differences: *first* of all, as the country’s economy was in ruins, the FRELIMO government did not have the funds to reward the demobilized soldiers of the government forces. *Second*, FAM veterans, while not demonized like the RENAMO combatants, did acquire an unsavoury reputation (...). Finally, they represented a war that was rather forgotten and, even if possible, it would not have been appropriate to reward the FAM veterans as national heroes. The FAM veterans were supposed to ‘fade away’.

The civil war army veterans had primarily been acquired through conscription, and the Mozambican government did not feel obliged to cater for them after war had come to an end. This is the unthankful attitude that ex-conscripts met over the years.

Another issue to consider is the issue of arms control. A concern on the proliferation of arms in Mozambique has been raised by Vanes (as cited in Chachiua, 1999), through declarations of Lionel Dyke, director of Mine-Tech, a Zimbabwean-based company involved in mine clearance in Mozambique, who affirmed that,

We are finding arms caches all the time. Even in the middle of the towns ... the weapons and ammunitions around here are a time bomb. Not necessarily for renewing the war, but there are plenty of guns and thousands of [rounds of] ammunition to keep criminals and poachers in business for decades.

In fact, the security problems are and will always be a challenge to the country because apart from those conscripts being discharged to the society every year, there are those ex-combatants who have and/or know where the arms are.

Although reports on the Disarmament and Demobilisation process claim a successful process compared to other cases, a large number of small arms continue to circulate in the country. Reisman and Lalá (2012), estimate that around six million weapons were imported into the country during the civil war. ONUMOZ had reported that about 3 to 4 million weapons were circulating in Mozambique at the end of the civil war. Following ONUMOZ's departure, various disarmament programs such as the Christian Council of Mozambique collected some 800,000 guns and other pieces of military equipment from the society in return for livelihood tools (Reisman and Lalá, 2012, p.24-25). However, there were doubts about disarmament. N'Magudu & Mosse (2012, p.25) state that:

The authorities do not know who owns what arms, or how they get access to them. The government does not even know the quantity of arms used by the uniformed forces. If the government cannot control the movement and use of small arms within its jurisdiction, clearly it cannot control the illicit proliferation and misuse of small arms in the country.

While Mozambique had many uncontrolled weapons, it is releasing into society ex-conscripts who are who are not well provided for materially. Conscripts only receive pocket money for the trip back home. This was confirmed by the head of National Recruitment Directorate who revealed that there was no provision for grants to be given out for integration of ex-conscripts in the society. It was also revealed that more than half of conscripted soldiers left the army after the two years as prescribed by the law and that the numbers of integration in the police organisation are not fixed and were done in an ad-hoc manner. And, according to his perception, the majority of these ex-conscripts are left to wander in the society.

While it is true that an unspecified number of ex-conscripts were integrated into the police, who boosted its capacity and minimised the likelihood of ex-conscripts to harm the society, it is also true that many ex-conscripts were left wandering in the society. Because of high levels of unemployment and the availability of small arms, Mozambique is experiencing

high levels of crimes that involve arms as shown in the appendix below. Also, RENAMO - led violence has increased since 2009 and armed gangs have also increased their activities. Although RENAMO had allegedly concealed some of its contingents during the peace process, the likelihood of current ex-conscripts being recruited to fill in RENAMO's armed wing is high.

Data from June 2014 to June 2015 of various records of criminal activities in the country indicates that among other violent crimes, 1880 were crimes involving the use of firearms<sup>10</sup>. From newspapers, violent crimes were reported from January 2014 to 31 August 2016.

Data collected from a state newspaper – jornal notícia online – from July 2014 to August 2016 reveals how the criminal situation is unfolding in Mozambique. It reveals that armed gangs consisting of 2 to 6 criminals and sometimes up to 20 were involved in assaulting residences to loot various goods, raping women and sometimes killing the owners if resistance is shown to the criminals. These armed robberies were committed against residences, cars, businesses.

Violent crimes involving firearms begets armed police response. Such has legitimised the militarisation of the police. With the end of the civil war and the introduction of the new democratic system, the government had to rely on the police to deal with all the internal security matters, thus, part of the military equipment and some best military Commanders were transferred to the police (Lalá, 2007, pp.114-115). Therefore, the police continue to integrate ex-soldiers and ex-conscripts, thus militarising the police in terms of human resources. This may at any given time endanger both the police and the society because military culture in a civilian police concurs to the use of military violence by the civil police in Law Enforcement. This places democratic principles in danger of violence.

Regarding police violence in law enforcement, Alice Mabota, the head of the Human Rights League, observe that due to the party-state linkage, the police were commanded to commit violence since instructions were received from their General Officers in the organisation. She observed that the Generals and Senior Officers of the police motivate the violence of the police.

---

<sup>10</sup> Data from Defence Force Headquarters not revealed for security reasons

## 5.5. Conclusion

The unintended consequences of military conscription – in terms of insecurity, were felt in the period following the peace agreement, in various forms such as increased violent crimes, massive possession of arms by civilian and the spread of former soldiers of both parties in the society. ONUMOZ's inability to disarm both regular and irregular forces from both belligerents, its inability to monitor and take care of the welfare of ex-soldiers and ex-conscripts, the inability of the Mozambican system from creating sound opportunities for ex-soldiers and ex-conscripts, left the country exposed to serious gangs, insurgency and violent crimes.

Although a monitoring body – the Reserve Command – has been established by Decree 41/2011 on 2<sup>nd</sup> September, it is not fully functional. The Reserve Command claims that it has no powers to monitor the ex-conscripts.<sup>11</sup> We conclude that, lack of integration and monitoring led to the failure to prevent the ex-conscripts from serving in rebellion or criminal activities since employment is a serious challenge in the country.

---

<sup>11</sup> Interview at Reserve Command, FADM Headquarters

## **CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION**

### **6.1. Introduction**

This study on the security implications of military conscription was set up to analyse the security benefits and costs of military conscription for Mozambique. The study investigated whether military conscription serves any military purpose. It also sought to investigate whether Mozambique has historically enjoyed the benefits of military conscription without suffering associated costs. The theoretical frameworks used in the study are the blowback theory and realism, and they informed the analysis. Military conscription can have enormous benefits if properly implemented, with proper safeguards in place. It is the lack of practical measures in the integration and monitoring of ex-conscripts that exposes the country to the danger they pose.

### **6.2. Summary of the Study**

The study on the security implications of military conscription in Mozambique looked at how conscription has turned the benefits of conscription into costs. It highlighted that conscription is a useful method of resourcing the armed forces. However, it is visible that the lack of integration and monitoring of discharged soldiers calls for new measures aimed at helping the country to avoid insurgencies or banditry. Examples have demonstrated that the non-integrated Portuguese ex-conscripts joined RENAMO and caused insecurity in the country. Now after the civil-war non-integrated RENAMO combatants fostered another insurgency that has continued to threaten the security of Mozambique.

### **6.3. Findings of the Study**

The study noted that conscription of black youths during the colonial era boosted the Portuguese fighting power, significantly reduced its financial costs, militarised the Mozambican state and society, and secured Portuguese colonial expansion. Conscription enabled the Portuguese colonial system to last longer and to contain the liberation struggle that sought to overthrow its rule. Conscription enabled Portugal to become an important colonial power that had a lot of influence over the African continent.

When Mozambique attained independence in 1975, it had amassed a large fighting force in the form of former Portuguese-trained soldiers and intelligence, and in the form of FRELIMO fighters. What was required was a delicate integration process that could have

enabled the two forces to work together as one, to integrate into society those that could not be absorbed into the security forces, and to educate those who were still eager to advance their education and create opportunities for all. But FRELIMO opposed integration, formed an exclusive security force (military, intelligence and police) that excluded ex-Portuguese fighters. It was this exclusion that created opportunities for the emergence of an insurgency that profited from an already trained fighting force, possessing sophisticated weaponry that Mozambique refused to integrate and benefit from. All ex-conscripts and militias associated with the Portuguese colonial system were left to their own devices and were not even properly disarmed. All these exploded onto the face of the Mozambican nation in the form of a very violent insurgency that established strong links with the Rhodesian state and with the Apartheid regimes. Therefore, what was not intended happened, plunging Mozambique into a protracted civil war that cost lives, devastated the economy, uprooted communities and destroyed infrastructure. Instead of benefiting the gains foretold by realism theory, Mozambique suffered the consequences foretold by blow back theory.

As a benefit of military conscription during the civil-war, the government conscripted many people either as military or militia forces due to the military needs of the time. The Mozambican government was able to resist RENAMO advances and to reduce its destabilisation of the country.

However, demobilisation and integration process was not successful because of various reasons mentioned in this study. Its failure resulted in huge security costs to the country in the form of armed robberies, violent murders, RENAMO insurgency and many other forms of insecurity as shown in the appendix. Yet military conscription continues, with even more unintended consequences.

#### **6.4. Recommendations**

In this section we suggest ways in which Mozambique could increase the benefits and mitigate the unintended consequences of military conscription. First, there is need for more research to help inform the debates around conscripts and security. There is a need to come up with policy strategies to achieve safety and security. There is a need for more studies within the defence and security organisations in particular and in the national and regional security sectors in general so that more in depth research on the subject can be conducted.

The following future research themes can be strategized to facilitate the attainment of achievable gains from the military conscription:

*(1) Conscription and army building in Mozambique*

*(2) The Economic costs of military conscription*

*(3) Deployment of conscripted soldiers in the regional peacekeeping missions.*

Finally, it is therefore recommendable that:

- a. The state should be aware of the potential negative consequences of ex-conscripts as far as national security is concerned and therefore should put in place effective programmes that take care of ex-conscripts.
- b. Mozambique should consider empowering the body responsible for managing the reserve forces in order to effectively monitor the reserve forces, especially the integration of the ex-conscripted soldiers.
- c. Mozambique should urgently approve the proposed retention policy for the Defence Forces in order to increase the security gains by preventing the mass discharge of conscripts and avoiding the consequent militarisation of the society, which is the source of armed gangs;
- d. The involvement of ex-conscripts on monthly reserve duty that has been proposed, and the Israeli Defence Force model should be used as a guiding tool regarding the use of ex-conscripts in Mozambique.
- e. The National Defence and Security Council should have civil members so that issues of security do not focus only on the state security issues (militaristic security view), but also on the modern security debates.
- f. The government of Mozambique should incorporate human security in its security model. Emphases should be put on human rights, on indigenous rights, economic rights and the security forces must be taught to respect and promote these rights.

## **6.5. Concluding Remarks**

The study has investigated the security implications of military conscription in Mozambique. It was found that military conscription has enormously benefited the country in securing the country throughout the colonial era, liberation war to the post-independence civil-war period.

However, the lack of practical measures regarding the integration and monitoring of ex-conscripts led the country to be exposed to the dangers experiences. The study concurs that conscription is therefore, with reference to Israel Defence Force experience, a successful policy only if properly managed. The complexity of integration and monitoring of ex-conscript nexus calls for the development of a national security policy which will care for these individuals after they have contributed to country's security policy and in their future deployment in the society.

## 7. REFERENCES

- Aird, S., et al. (2001). Mozambique: The Battle Continues for Former Child Soldiers. Youth Advocate Program International Resource paper.
- Alemazung Joy A. (2010). Post-colonial colonialism: An analysis of international factors and actors marring African socio-economic and political development. *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, 3(10): 62-84.
- Alexander, J. (1997). The local state in post-war Mozambique: political practice and ideas about authority. *Africa* 67(01): 1-26.
- Babbie, E. (2007). *The Practice of Social Research*, 11<sup>th</sup> Ed. Belmont: Wadsworth
- Babbie, E. (2010). *The Practice of Social Research*, Belmont: Wadsworth
- Bearne, S., et al. (2005). "National Security Decision-Making Structures and Security Sector Reform." Westbrook Centre: RAND Publications. Retrieved on 17 August 2015 from [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical\\_reports/2005/RAND\\_TR289.pdf](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR289.pdf)
- Bjorn, M. (1995), *Dictionary of Alternative Defence*. London: Lynne Reinner Publisher
- Boletim da República, I Série – Número 47, de 25 de Novembro de 2009. Publicação Oficial da República de Moçambique
- Chachua, M. (1999), The status of arms flows in Mozambique. Monograph No 34: *Weapons Flows in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Swaziland* January 1999. Retrieved from: <https://www.issafrika.org/pubs/Monographs/No34/TheStatus.html> on 29 June 2015.
- Chitiyo, K. (2009). "The case for security sector reform in Zimbabwe." London: Royal United Services Institute.
- Coelho, J. P. B. (2002) African troops in the Portuguese colonial army, 1961-1974: Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. *Portuguese Studies Review* 10 (1) (2002): 129-50
- Coelho, J. P. B. (2003). *Da violência colonial ordenada à ordem pós-colonial violenta*. Sobre um legado das guerras coloniais nas ex-colónias portuguesas. Retrieved on 23 June 2015 from <http://www.lusotopie.sciencespobordeaux.fr/borges2003.pdf>
- Constituição Da República de Moçambique (2009). Maputo: Escolar Editora.
- Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique of 2004. Mozambique's Legal Resource Portal. Retrieved on 15 May 2015, from [www.mozlegal.com](http://www.mozlegal.com)
- Da Cunha, D. (1999). "Sociological Aspects of the Singapore Armed Forces." *Armed Forces & Society* 25(3): 459-475.
- Defence Service Law (of Israel) – Consolidated Version 5746-1986, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Retrieved on 16 September 2016, from <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-archive/1980-1989/pages/defence%20service%20law%20-consolidated%20version--%205746-1.aspx>
- Dictionary of Military Terms, 2003;

- Dinerman, A. (2006). *Revolution, Counter-Revolution and Revisionism in Postcolonial Africa: The case of Mozambique 1975 – 1994*. New York: Routledge.
- Dissel, A. & Newham, G. (2011). Report on Policing in South Africa 2010 and beyond. Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved on 12 April 2015 from [www.issafrica.org](http://www.issafrica.org)
- Dissel, A. and Frank, C. Eds. (2012). *Policing and Human Rights: Assessing southern African countries' compliance with the SARPCCO Code of Conduct for Police Officials*. Cape Town: APCOF
- Donnelly, J. (2000). *Realism in International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Donnelly, J. (2005). *Realism*. In S. Burchill, A. Linklater, R. Devetak, J. Donnelly, M. Paterson, C. Reus-Smit, et al.(eds.), *Theories of International Relation, 3rd ed* (pp. 29-53). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Galiani, S., et al. (2010). "Conscription and crime: evidence from the Argentine draft lottery." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 3(2): 119-136.
- Giroux, H. A. (2004). War on terror: The militarisation of public space and culture in the United States. *Third Text* 18(4): 211-221.
- Hall, M. (1990). The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (RENAMO ): A study in the destruction of an African country. *Africa* 60(01): 39-68.
- Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth W. Thompson & W. David Clinton. (2006). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power. 7th ed*. New York: Lyn Uhl.
- Hegghammer, T. (2010) The Rise of Muslim foreign fighters: Islam and the globalisation of Jihad. *International Security*, 35:35-94
- Henning, E. (2004). *Finding your Way in Qualitative Research*. Pretoria: Van Schaick Publishers.
- Honwana, A. (1999). "Negotiating post-war identities: Child soldiers in Mozambique and Angola." *Codesria Bulletin* 1(2): 4-13. Retrieved on 10 July 2015 from [https://www.medico.de/download/report26/ps\\_honwana\\_en.pdf](https://www.medico.de/download/report26/ps_honwana_en.pdf)
- Johnson, C. (2000) *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of the American Empire*. London: Little, Brown and Company
- Kalusopa, T. and P. Ngulube (2012). "Developing an e-records readiness framework for labour organizations in Botswana." *Information Development* 28(3): 199-215.
- Kellner, D. (2003). Postmodern military and permanent war. In C. Boggs (ed.), *Masters of War: Militarism and Blowback in the Era of the American Empire* (pp. 229-244). New York: Routledge.
- Krebs, R. R. (2006). Myths of the all-volunteer force: Rethinking military recruitment and the fate of the citizen-soldier. Paper presented at the conference on "Citizenship, the Soldier, and the State," at the Maxwell School of Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Retrieved on 25 April 2015 [http://www.polisci.umn.edu/~ronkrebs/Publications/Myths% 20of](http://www.polisci.umn.edu/~ronkrebs/Publications/Myths%20of).

- Kruger, N. (2005). "ZANU (PF) strategies in general elections, 1980–2000: Discourse and coercion." *African Affairs* 104(414): 1-34.
- Kwon, I. (2000). *Militarism in my heart: Militarization of women's consciousness and culture in South Korea*. Palce of publication: Clark University.
- Lala', A. (2007). *Mozambique*. In G. Cawthra, A. du Pisani, & A. Omari (eds.), *Security and Democracy in Southern Africa* (pp. 108-122). Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
- Lamb, G. et al., (2012). "Assessing the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in the Context of Instability and Informal Economies." Transition Demobilization and Reintegration Program (TDRP). Retrieved on 27 October 2016 from <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/672331468001821356/pdf/714820WP0Info r00Box370075B00PUBLIC0.pdf>
- Leander, A. (2004). Drafting community: Understanding the fate of conscription." *Armed Forces & Society* 30(4): 571-599.
- Lei do Serviço Militar Obrigatório. Nr. 4/78 de 23 de Março. I Série, Número 35 do Boletim da República. [*Law of Obligatory Military Service of 1978*]
- Lei do Serviço Militar Obrigatório. No 24/97 de 23 de Dezembro. I Série, Número 51 do Boletim da República. Suplemento da Publicação Oficial da República de Moçambique. [*Law of Obligatory Military Service of 1997*]
- Lei do Serviço Militar. No 32/2009. 25 de Novembro de 2009. I Série, Número 47 do Boletim da República. [*Law of Military Service of 2009*]
- Malache, A., Macaringue, P. & Coelho, J. B. (2005). Profound transformations and regional conflagrations: The history of Mozambique's armed forces from 1975–2005. In M. Rupyia (Ed). *Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa*. pp.155-198.Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.”
- Manungo, K. D. (2007). *Zimbabwe*. In G. Cawthra, A. du Pisani, & A. Omari (eds.), *Security and Democracy in Southern Africa*. (pp. 221-232). Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
- Mariscal, J. (2003). Lethal Compassionate: The Militarization of US Culture. *Counterpunch*, 1. Retrieved on 13 Feb 2017 from <http://www.counterpunch.org/2003/05/03/the-militarization-of-us-culture/>
- Morris, D. S. (2006). *Film as Public Pedagogy in the Us Culture of Militarism. Place of publication* The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Mashike, L. (2000). Standing down or standing out? Demobilising and reintegrating former soldiers. *African Security Review* 9(5/6): pages?
- Neuman, L. W. (2006). *Social Research Methods*. Boston: Pearson Education.
- New Oxford American Dictionary 2007
- Ostheimer A.E. (2001) Mozambique: Country Risk Profile 2001: Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC); Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved on 16 July 2015 from

[http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user\\_upload/Media/Projects/FAST/Africa/Mozambique/Mozambique\\_Case\\_Study\\_2001.pdf](http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Projects/FAST/Africa/Mozambique/Mozambique_Case_Study_2001.pdf)

Oxford Advanced Learners' Dictionary of Current English (2007)

Parlamento Juvenil, (2012). *Juventude e Serviço Militar em Moçambique*, Maputo. Lázaro Mabunda: Jornalista.

Pfaffenzeller, S. (2010). "Conscription and democracy: The mythology of civil–military relations." *Armed Forces & Society* 36(3): 481-504

Phani M. K, (2013), Functions, roles and duties of police in general, retrieved on 23 April 2015, from <http://www.slideshare.net/phanis9/functions-roles-and-duties-of-police-in-general>

**Pradhan, S.** (n/d). *6 Principles of "Political Realism" Explained*. Retrieved on 31 May 2015 from <http://www.shareyouressays.com/113182/6-important-principles-of-political-realism-explained>

Programa do Governo. (2010). *Programa Quinquenal do Governo para 2010-2014*, Maputo: Governo de Moçambique.

Reisman, L. and A. Lalá (2012). "Assessment of Crime and Violence in Mozambique." Commissioned by the Open Society Foundation's CVPI & OSISA

Reus-Smit, C. and J. True (2001). "Theories of International Relations." *Theories of International Relations*: 212-235.

Rupiya, M. R. (2011). *The Military Factor in Zimbabwe's Political and Electoral Affairs, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition*. Retrieved on 27 June 2015 from <http://www.swradioafrica.com/Documents/The%20Military%20Factor%20in%20Zimbabwe.pdf>.

Schneid , Frederick C. (2009). *Introduction*. In Donald Stoker, F. C. Schneid, & H. D. Blanton 9eds.), *Conscription in the Napoleonic Era: A revolution in military affairs?* (pp. 1-6). London and New York: Routledge.

Seibert, G. (2003). The vagaries of violence and power in post-colonial Mozambique. In Abbink, J. et al. (eds.) *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History*. Brill". Clearance Center

*Serviço Militar no país - Cumprir e ter colocação entregue ao «Deus dará»* Retrieved on 15 May 2015 from [http://macua.blogs.com/moambique\\_para\\_todos/files/servio\\_militar\\_no\\_pas\\_cumprir.doc](http://macua.blogs.com/moambique_para_todos/files/servio_militar_no_pas_cumprir.doc)

Sinclair, J. (2001). *English Dictionary for Advanced Learners*. Glasgow: Harper Collins Cobuild

South African Concise Oxford Dictionary (1999)

Tanter, R. (1991). *Intelligence Agencies and Third World Militarization: A Case Study of Indonesia*, with Special Reference to South Korea, 1961-1989. Monash: Monash University Press.

The Oxford Advanced Learners' Dictionary of Current English (2007)

Thomson & Clinton, (2005). *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. Boston, Lyn Ubl.

Tribunal Militar Revolucionário, 1979-1989, Retrieved on 26 July 2015 from <http://www.mozambiquehistory.net/tmr.php>

Tsucana, F. F., et al. (2005). "*Organização do estágio curricular do curso de bacharelato em Ciências Policiais*." UEM EDUC Dissertações de Mestrado. Retrieved on 22 July 2015, from <http://hdl.handle.net/10857/1788>

United Nations, (2010). *DDR in Peace Operations a Retrospective*. New York. Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Voz da Revolução No. 67, (1979). *5ª Sessão do Comité Central da FRELIMO*. Orgão oficial do Partido FRELIMO, Departamento do Trabalho Ideológico, Maputo

Webster Comprehensive Dictionary, 2000

Wiegink, N. (2013). "*the Forgotten sons of the state: the social and Political Positions of Former Government soldiers in Post-War Mozambique*." *Colombia Internacional* (77): 43-72.

Woolf, L., et. al., (2016) *Military Service*. The Publications Department of the Ministry of Aliyah and Immigrant Absorption, 7<sup>th</sup> Ed, Jerusalem. Retrieved on 16 August 2016 from [http://www.moia.gov.il/Publications/idf\\_en.pdf](http://www.moia.gov.il/Publications/idf_en.pdf)

Yaganoglu, S. (2006). "*Securitization, Militarization, and Gender Issue in Turkey*." 1-89. Ankara: Bilkent University Press.

<http://study.com/academy/lesson/political-realism-theory-definition-principles.html>.

<http://www.heureka.clara.net/books/war.htm>

## 8. ANNEXES

### Annex A. RENAMO Armed Violence since 2009

S/N	DATE	ACTION	CONSEQUENCE
<b>2009</b>			
1.	2009	RENAMO leader, Afonso Dhlakama, lost the general elections of 2009 and threatened to restart the civil war	N/A
<b>2012</b>			
2.	March 08th	RENAMO leader special forces killed a police officer during fights with the police in Nampula city.	1 police officer killed
3.	October 17th	Dhlakama returns and sets himself up in his former Base of Gorongosa and starts training his veterans ex-combatants, demanding a new political order	N/A
<b>2013</b>			
4.	April 4th	4 government police officers and a RENAMO militant were killed during a rebel – government security forces fight in a police headquarter in Muxungue, in the central province of Sofala.	4 police members killed 1 RENAMO gunman killed
5.	April 6th	RENAMO 's gunmen attacked a bus and a track on N1 between Rio Save and Muxungue.	2 civilians killed
6.	June 17th	RENAMO gunmen assaulted government depot and kills 6 soldiers in Savane, in Sofala province	6 soldiers killed
7.	June 24	RENAMO attacks 3 civilian vehicles near Muxungue region	
8.	29 July	RENAMO leader, Afonso Dhlakama, threatens to split the country	
9.	July 30	Afonso Dhlakama, RENAMO leader, during its annual National Council meeting gave ultimatum to the government that he would decide on his own regarding splitting the country into two.	
10.	September 11	Afonso Dhlakama asked the government to remove the security forces surrounding his base as a condition for meeting the president.	
11.	October 17	Government through MoD announced that RENAMO ambushed government forces	2 gunmen killed
12.	October 21	RENAMO announced an end of Rome Accords after the government forces' attacked and occupied his main base in Gorongosa	
13.	October 22	RENAMO gunmen attacked a police station in Maringue.	No death reported but populations leave the area
14.	October 26	RENAMO gunmen attacked a bus along N1 and RENAMO 's spokesperson says the party has lost the control of its gunmen.	1 civilian killed and 10 injured
15.	October 29	RENAMO attacked northern regions of the country. The gunmen attack Rapale in Nampula Province. - in the same day the fights continue between the gunmen and the government forces in Maringue, Gorongosa district	
16.	October 31	Renamo's gunment fought the government forces in Mutiveze and Navevene in Nampula	2 people killed
17.	November 1	RENAMO 's gunmen attacked government forces convoy moving on N1 with high ranks officials - 18 RENAMO gunmen supposedly guarding the leader's residence in Nampula city were captured	2 killed, 5 injured and a car got burnt.

		in Rapale after secretly escaping from the city.	
18.	November 2	RENAMO gunmen attacked a civil-military convoy along N1 in Muxungue.	1 killed and 3 injured
19.	November 4	RENAMO gunmen attacked two civil-military convoys along N1 in Muxungue	5 civilians injured
20.	November 5	RENAMO gunmen attacked Canda's health facility, Nhamadzi district in Sofala province	
21.	November 8	Gunmen attack a bus along N1 in Rio Save – Muxungue road.	A Bus was immobilized
22.	November 15	RENAMO attacked convoy at Pembe, along N1 towards Muxungue	2 killed and 9 injured
23.	November 30	RENAMO gunmen attacked two convoys along Rio Save – Muxungue N1 road	3 killed and tens injured
24.	December 12	RENAMO gunmen attacked security forces base in Vunduzi, in Gorongosa	No casualties
25.	December 30	A three days attack to Tambarara in Gorongosa by gunmen was registered according to Lusa Agency reports	2 killed, 1 injured and looting of a shop
2014			
26.	January 1st	Gunmen attacked two civil-military convoys in Muxungue	2 citizens Injured
27.	January 7	RENAMO gunmen fought police forces in Homoine, Inhambane province.	
28.	January 14	Gunmen attacked Funhalouro in Inhambane province	1 police killed
29.	January 15	Two attacks against a civilian bus and military convoy along N1 in Muxungue region	3 killed and 5 injured
30.	January 18	RENAMO gunmen attacked a civil-military convoy along Muxungue – Save route on N1.	1 killed and 5 individuals injured
31.	January 20	RENAMO Gunmen handling new equipment encamp themselves in Moatize, Tete province next to the mining companies.	Not registered
32.	February 25	Gunmen and government forces fights were reported in Gorongosa.	People fled their houses.
33.	February 26	Gunmen movement in Moatize forces the population to flee to Malawi in Neno and Chikwakwa.	About 2000 people move to Malawi
34.	March 31	Gunmen attacked governments force in Gorongosa.	Not indicated
35.	April 2	Vale train transporting coal to Beira port was attacked by the gunmen in Muanza, Sofala province.	Engine driver injured
36.	April 22	Fighting between government forces and RENAMO 's gunmen was reported in Gorongosa, Sofala province.	2 killed and 5 injured
37.	April 24	RENAMO leader threatened to boycott the general elections	
38.	May 2	RENAMO announces the re-establishment of its armed wing in Sofala province.	
39.	May 4	RENAMO gunmen attacked a convoy along N1 between Save and Muxungue	5 injured among the injured one is a child
40.	May 6	RENAMO 's gunmen attacked a convoy along N1 in Ripembe, Sofala province, along N1 inbetween Save and Moxungue. - using explosive, the gunmen opened crater on N1.	A non-indicated number of Citizens was injured
41.	May 15	Fights between gunmen and government forces in Murrothane, 50km north of Mocuba in	1 killed and 1 injury

		Zambeze province were reported	
42.	June 2	Gunmen attacked a civil-military convoy in Zove, 10 km from Muxungue on N1.	7 injured
43.	June 3	Two attacks by gunmen in Zove on N1 were reported.	1 killed and 6 injured
44.	June 4	RENAMO 's Secretary general threatened to split the country if the government refused the parity on military personnel at the peace talks - Gunmen attacked in the central region.	3 injured
45.	June 8	RENAMO threatened to spread the conflict to the other regions because government forces attacked Dhlakama hiding place in Gorongosa	
46.	June 15	Gunmen ambushed and attacked a convoy in Gorongosa.	15 injured
47.	June 16	Gunmen attacked a civil-convoy in Zave along Muxungue area in Sofala province	Injuring a Chinese citizen.
48.	June 17	Gunmen attacked in Murrothone, interior of Mocuba district in Zambeze province.	14 injured
49.	June 21	Six gunmen attacked a civil-military convoy along N1, in Muxungue, Sofala Province	2 killed
50.	June 24	During RENAMO rally in Beira, Sofala province, the leader, Afonso Dhlakama threatened to split the country if the government does not allow a unified Army.	
51.	June 27	A civil-military convoy was attacked in Mutinda, 22km from Muxungue in Sofala Province.	4 killed
52.	August 24	RENAMO and Government sign a ceasefire agreement	
53.	August 25	RENAMO leader announces that he has instructed the gunmen to stop with the attacks.	
54.	<b>November 26</b>	The Parliament refused to include in the agenda a RENAMO 's proposal for the Government of Unity	
55.	<b>December 5</b>	Constitutional Council of Moçambique rejects RENAMO's appeal regarding annulment of the general election. On the same day concerning the rejection of the appeal, RENAMO declared that was to resume the war	
56.	<b>December 11</b>	Dhlakama suggested a referendum for the splitting of the country.	
<b>2015</b>			
57.	<b>February 6</b>	RENAMO boycotts its seats in the provincial assemblies	
58.	<b>Abril</b>	Daily fights between government and RENAMO 's armed wing in <b>Passane</b> .	<b>Residents fled from conflicting areas to South Africa and teachers and students abandoned schools</b>
59.	<b>April 30</b>	Because the National Parliament dominated by Frelimo did not pass the RENAMO 's proposed law for provincial autarchy, the leader, Afonso Dhlakama, threatened to govern the provincial autarchies using force	
60.	<b>June 11</b>	During 5th Party's Conference in Beira, RENAMO announced that it has created its own police and that it would re-organise its armed wing to force the provincial autarchy in order to respond to eventual government	

		attacks.	
61.	<b>July 25 &amp; 26</b>	Fights between government forces and RENAMO 's armed wing in Tete.	Houses are burnt and the populations fled to Malawi
62.	<b>August 20</b>	Dhlakama regretted having signed the Peace Agreement in 1992 and announced that he was going to recruit young people for his militia. In a party rally in Quelimane, RENAMO announced that it was going to create a military base in Murrumba. - Dhlakama declared that RENAMO would recruit young people to serve in army and the police.	N/A
63.	<b>October 28</b>	Fights between the gunmen and government force was registered in Murrumbala, Zambeze province	5 injured and 90 killed Looting of various goods of the population
64.	<b>October 30</b>	Fights between the gunmen and the government were registered in Inhaminga, Sofala Province	Not registered
65.	<b>November 30</b>	Dhlakama continued promising to split the country after the Christmas and New Year festivals	N/A
<b>2016</b>			
66.	<b>January 14</b>	Although Dhlakama promised not to return to war but, he threatened that in March he would take power place at the same time in Nampula, Sofala, Tete, Zambézia, Manica and Niassa leading from his military base in Satunjira, Gorongosa district in Sofala Province.	N/A
67.	<b>February (n.d)</b>	Fights continued in Zambeze Province  The fights are intensified in Murrumbala, Zambeze Province	1 Injured Not indicated
68.	<b>February 8</b>	RENAMO announced that would install check points to inspect vehicles in the main roads of the 6 claimed provinces	N/A
69.	<b>February 23 and 24</b>	Gunmen continued attacking: - two attacks to civil-military convoys on routes Muxungue-Save and Nhamapaza-Caia 23 Feb - a third attack to a civil-military convoy took place at Zave, route Save-Muxungue	Damage to vehicles
70.	<b>March 5</b>	Gunmen attacked twice a civil-military convoy along N1 and N6 at Honde, Manica province	2 killed
71.	<b>March 10</b>	RENAMO gunmen infiltrated Quelimane city, in Zambeze Province	Panic among the population
72.	<b>April 24</b>	RENAMO gunmen on Monday morning attacked a Mozambican police station at Chiramba, in Chemba district, in the Sofala Province <sup>12</sup>	Nurses, teachers and other state employees fled to Chemba, located at 50 kilometres from Chiramba
73.	<b>June 7</b>	RENAMO Gunmen on Monday attacked a train of the Brazilian mining company Vale in Cheringoma district, in Sofala Province <sup>13</sup>	shattering of train windscreen and injuring the driver's mate
74.	<b>June 11</b>	RENAMO gunmen blocked the main road from Chimoio to Tete and burnt three trucks in three days after another met the same fate <sup>14</sup>	Burnt 3 tracks

<sup>12</sup> <http://allafrica.com/stories/201604270455.html>

<sup>13</sup> <http://allafrica.com/stories/201606081138.html>

<sup>14</sup> <http://allafrica.com/stories/201606130905.html>

75.	<b>June 29</b>	RENAMO gunmen blocked roads and attacked trucks <sup>15</sup> RENAMO gunmen attacked a convoy on the main road between Tete and Chimoio cities <sup>16</sup> .	- Damage to a vehicle - 20 injured and a bus damaged
76.	<b>July 15</b>	Gunmen ambushed a civil-military convoy on EN7 highway in Barue, in Manica Province <sup>17</sup>	2 drivers were injured
77.	<b>July 20</b>	RENAMO Gunmen on Sunday morning attacked a health centre and a police station in Muapula, Niassa Province <sup>18</sup> .	stolen medicines and surgical equipment from the health centre
78.	July 30	A group of gunmen identified itself as RENAMO entered the village of Mopeia, in Zambeze Province, at about 3 a.m., two local residents said. <sup>19</sup>	Stolen unspecified quantities of medicines, serum bags, bed sheets, and mosquito nets
79.	<b>July 31</b>	About a dozen RENAMO gunmen raided the village of Maiaca, Maúa district, in Niassa Province. 24 RENAMO gunmen raided the health clinic in Muapula, In Niassa	Stolen five kits of HIV tests, four boxes of syringes, and over 600 vials of penicillin, Stolen 5 obstetric kits, over 200 tetanus vaccines, and over 300 vials of penicillin.
80.	August 12	About a dozen RENAMO gunmen entered the town of Morrumbala, in Zambeze Province about 4 a.m. <sup>20</sup> .	Panic among the population
81.	August 15	RENAMO Gunmen ambushed a car at Nangue, in the district of Cheringoma, Sofala Province	6 killed and a car put burnt
82.	<b>August 19</b>	RENAMO Gunmen on Thursday morning attacked the small town of Mepinha, in Morrumbala district, in Zambeze Province <sup>21</sup> .	vandalized public property
83.	August 23	RENAMO Gunmen ambushed a civil military convoy in the area between Vanduzi and Luenha river in Manica Province <sup>22</sup> .	wounded four people

<http://macua.blogs.com/files/cronologia-do-conflito-entre-a-RENAMO-e-o-governo-de-mo%C3%A7ambique-dw.docx> retrieved 08 Sept 2016

<sup>15</sup> <http://allafrica.com/stories/201606300011.html>

<sup>16</sup> *ibid*

<sup>17</sup> <http://allafrica.com/stories/201607270669.html>

<sup>18</sup> <http://allafrica.com/stories/201607270659.html>

<sup>19</sup> <http://allafrica.com/stories/201608240456.html>

<sup>20</sup> *ibid*

<sup>21</sup> <http://allafrica.com/stories/201608200174.html>

<sup>22</sup> <http://allafrica.com/stories/201608240172.html>

## Annex B. Records of Criminal Activities by Various Armed Gangs

S/N	Date	Type of Crime/Activity	Place	No. Involved Remarks
1.	31.08.2016	Police arrested 6 criminals involved in various armed robbery crimes <sup>23</sup>	Matola - Maputo	6 perpetrators
2.	31.08.2016	Armed robbery against residence <sup>24</sup>	Matola – Maputo	2 perpetrators
3.	30.08.2016	Police seized a gang of criminals involved in Armed robbery against residence <sup>25</sup>	Chimoio – Manica	3 perpetrators
4.	04.07.2016	Police frustrated and arrested a gang of criminals attempting an armed robbery against shops <sup>26</sup>	Vilankulo - Inhambane	2 arrested and 1 killed during gunfire exchange
5.	Jan & Feb 2016 27.07.2016	- Various assaults, robbery of different goods and rapes in residences were reported - Police arrested two (2) gangs of criminals involved in Armed robbery against residence <sup>27</sup>	Kumbeza – Maputo	5 perpetrators each assault and not specific number of arrested
6.	18.05.2016	A Resident reported armed robbery against his residence extracting various goods and money <sup>28</sup>	Marracuene-Cumbeza-Maputo	4 perpetrators were involved
7.	13.05.2016	Police dismantled a gang of criminals involved in armed robbery to various properties <sup>29</sup>	Beira - Sofala	8 perpetrators were arrested
8.	03.05.2016	Police arrested an armed gang of seven individuals aged 18 - 32 charged with murders, burglaries to various institutions and livestock robbery <sup>30</sup> .	Moamba Maputo	7 perpetrators were arrested
9.	24.03.2016	Police arrested a 26 years old man, member of on armed robbery gang involved in various armed robbery against residences, shops and properties <sup>31</sup>	Marracuene – Maputo	1 perpetrator
10.	02.03.2016	- Residents' reported various atrocities carried out by armed gangs that included murders of six citizens, three shots and various police and gangs gunfire exchange.  - Further police arrested two gangs of armed robbery against various properties <sup>32</sup>	Albazine – Maputo City	Not indicated

<sup>23</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/57861-que-actuavam-nalguns-bairros-da-matola-policia-detem-supostos-assaltantes-a-mao-armada.html>

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/breves/56143-policia-desmantela-assaltantes-no-chimoio.html>

<sup>26</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/sociedade/54959-policia-frustra-assalto-em-vilankulo.html>

<sup>27</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/52724-cumbeza-cresce-com-desafios-por-superar.html>

<sup>28</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/sociedade/52658-doencas-endemicas-prevencao-exige-coordenacao>

<sup>29</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/breves/55936-desmantelada-quadrilha-de-assaltantes.html>

<sup>30</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/sociedade/54666-sete-meliantes-fora-de-accao-na-moamba.html>

<sup>31</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/52479-assaltante-neutralizado.html>

<sup>32</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/primeiro-plano/50405-chihango-entre-o-medo-e-a-corrida-pelo-espaco.html>

11.	08.01.2016	Police neutralised a gang of 5 individuals in attempt to an armed assault to shops in Maputo city. The gang is said to be have committed various armed robbery to residences, shops and vehicles in the capital city. <sup>33</sup>	Maputo outskirts	5 perpetrator involved of which 3 were killed and 2 run away during gunfire exchange
12.	09.11.2015	An armed gang attacked and assaulted a church farming and cattle raising Institute in Mossuril district in Nampula and stole 4 computers, unspecified amount and other goods belonging to Christian's sisters residing in the Institute. <sup>34</sup>	Mussoril-Nampula	20 perpetrators were involved
	08.11.2015	- In the Especial Economic Zone in Nacala aa armed robbery gang comprised of 8 perpetrators assaulted a restaurant at Naherengue beach in Nacala, Nampula and shot the owner getting hold of a coffer containing unespecified ammount. <sup>35</sup>	Nacala – Nampula	8 perpetrators of which 3 were shot dead, 1 wounded and the owner was also wounded
13.	08.10.2015	Various assault to residences and rapes in Polana-Caniço in Maputo City were reported by the residents	Maputo City	Not indicated
	not indicated	Two weeks back police neutralized an armed robbery gang <sup>36</sup>	Maputo city	Not indicated
14.	26.08.2015	Police arrested a member of armed robbery gang <sup>37</sup>	Maputo city	1 perpetrator
15.	03.07.2015	Police neutralized an armed car theft gang <sup>38</sup>	Marracuene – Maputo	3 perpetrator
16.	04.07.2015	Police arrested 3 of 4 members of armed robbery gang attempting to break into a bank <sup>39</sup>	Beira - Sofala	3 perpetrators arrested 1 of which wounded and the 4th run away
17.	14.05.2015	A member of an armed robbery against residences was arest by police. The gang was said to comprise of 4 members who terrorized and assaulted residences and vehicles in Namaacha and Marracuene in Maputo <sup>40</sup>	Namaacha and Marracuene – Maputo	1 perpetrator arrested
18.	01.4.2015	A member of an armed car theft gang was arrested by police <sup>41</sup> .	Maputo City	1 perpetrator arrested
19.	04.03.2015	An Armed robbery gang shot 2 persons and stole in a shop <sup>42</sup>	Beira-Sofala	2 perpetrators being hunted by the

<sup>33</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/49226-bandidos-mortos-apos-assalto-frustrado.html>

<sup>34</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/sociedade/46131-crime-atormenta-nampula.html>

<sup>35</sup> *ibid*

<sup>36</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/44463-bairro-da-polana-canico-crime-a-solta-na-zona-do-golfe.html>

<sup>37</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/42135-perseguido-policia-termina-em-sinistro.html>

<sup>38</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/39199-deticidos-assaltantes-de-viaturas.html>

<sup>39</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/ultima-hora/14-sociedade/37596-tiroteio-gera-panico-na-beira.html>

<sup>40</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/sociedade/36479-assaltantes-aterroizam-namaacha-e-marracuene.html>

<sup>41</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/34146-ladros-de-carros-nas-maos-da-policia.html>

				police
20.	05.02.2015	Police arrested a gang specialised in armed robbery to various properties and vehicles <sup>43</sup>	Machava – Maputo	6 perpetrators arrested
21.	04.02.2015	Police arrested an armed robbery gang which assaulted various properties and vehicles. One member was said to be member of the national police <sup>44</sup>	Maputo city	6 perpetrators
22.	06.01.2015	A member of an armed robbery gang was arrested by police <sup>45</sup>	Matola – Maputo	1 perpetrator arrested
	06.01.2015	Police recovered a vehicle assaulted by a gang or armed robbery in Matola Maputo <sup>46</sup>	Matola- Maputo	N/A
23.	17.12.2014	An armed robbery gang which assaulted various properties was arrested by the police. The members of the gang aged between 32-41 are also accused of assault the police station at Josina Machel Island and the stealing of a firearm <sup>47</sup> .	Manhiça- Maputo	4 perpetrators
24.	16.12.2014	Police arrested a gang of armed robbery who assaulted and stole about 4 thousands of meticaís from a citizen who was going to a local bank in Quelimane, Zambézia <sup>48</sup>	Quelimane- Zambézia	3 perpetrators arrested
25.	19.11.2014	Two young men both aged 22 were arrested after a failed armed robbery to a residence in Matola. They were said to belong to an armed robbery gang accused of committing various armed robbery to various properties <sup>49</sup>	Matola-Maputo	2 perpetrators
26.	08.10.2014	Police arrested a citizen for illegal possession of firearm. The man is said to belong to a group of gangs of armed robbery <sup>50</sup>	Beira-Sofala	1 perpetrator
27.	23.09.2014	A gang of armed robbery assaulted a residence and raped two young sisters. The gang further robbed various goods. The perpetrators are said to belong to a large gang that terrorizes in the same way many residents of Matola city <sup>51</sup>	Matola-Maputo	5 perpetrators
28.	21.09.2014	Police arrested six members of armed robbery gangs involved in various assaults to residences and vehicle theft. The gang is said to be involved in robbery and rapes in Matola city outskirts. <sup>52</sup>	Matola-Maputo	6 perpetrators

<sup>42</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/breves/32564-assaltantes-baleiam-na-beira.html>

<sup>43</sup> [http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/31106-mais-meliantes-neutralizados.html?fb\\_comment\\_id=849118315147491\\_849342315125091#f9eaf925d077f](http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/31106-mais-meliantes-neutralizados.html?fb_comment_id=849118315147491_849342315125091#f9eaf925d077f)

<sup>44</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/31028-assaltantes-a-contas-com-a-policia.html>

<sup>45</sup> <http://jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/29621-ocorr7.html>

<sup>46</sup> **ibid**

<sup>47</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/sociedade/28565-assaltantes-detidos-na-manhica>

<sup>48</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/sociedade/28500-assaltantes-detidos-em-quelimane.html>

<sup>49</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/26983-tentavam-assaltar-residencia-na-liberdade.html>

<sup>50</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/sociedade/24521-surpreendido-com-duas-pistolas>

<sup>51</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/23636-irmas-violadas-no-1-de-maio>

<sup>52</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/57861-que-actuavam-nalguns-bairros-da-matola-policia-detem-supostos-assaltantes-a-mao-armada.html>

29.	0108.2014	Police arrested members of a gang accused of various armed robberies. The gang members are aged 26-34 years old. <sup>53</sup>	Maputo-Matola	4 perpetrators
30.	22.07.2014	Police neutralized a gang of armed robbery in an operation in co-ordination with the residents of Albazine, a residential area outskirts Maputo city. The gang is accused of perpetrating various atrocities such as armed robbery to residences, car theft and rapes <sup>54</sup> .	Maputo city outskirts	Not revealed
31.	20.07.2014	Four individuals belonging to a gang of armed robbery of 8 individuals were arrested by the police. The gang is accused of perpetrating various assaults to residences where it stole vehicles, TV sets, etc. They are said to be aged between 21-25 years old. <sup>55</sup>	Matola-Maputo	4 perpetrators arrested

<sup>53</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/20499-recuperadas-viaturas-roubadas-na-matola.html>

<sup>54</sup> [http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/primeiro-plano/19817-crime-ateerroriza-albasine?fb\\_comment\\_id=734384716622328\\_734832469910886&device=desktop#f37e5a52c3d5fd8](http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/primeiro-plano/19817-crime-ateerroriza-albasine?fb_comment_id=734384716622328_734832469910886&device=desktop#f37e5a52c3d5fd8)

<sup>55</sup> <http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/capital/19688-redcfrsdx.html>