Management and mismanagement of factionalism in political parties in Botswana, 1962-2013

Abstract

This paper is on the management of political parties. It uses Botswana as a case study to demonstrate the utility of formal and informal arrangements. Its argument is that informal mechanisms work well when they supplement rather than replace or compete with formal arrangements. In this regard, the paper’s first argument is that the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has relied on both formal and informal mechanisms of conflict resolution, and has as a result enjoyed better organizational stability. It also argues that as for the opposition Botswana Peoples Party (BPP) and Botswana National Front (BNF) one has both weak formal and informal mechanisms, and the other has allowed formal and informal mechanisms to work against each other. In both opposition parties, informal mechanisms were not relied upon to resolve internal conflicts, exposing them to political instability.